Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax by Graetz, Michael J.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
1979 
Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax 
Michael J. Graetz 
Columbia Law School, mgraet@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1979). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/395 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
VOLUME 92
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
IMPLEMENTING A PROGRESSIVE
CONSUMPTION TAX
Michael J. Graetz *
Much scholarly debate has been devoted to the theoretical merits
of using an individual's consumption expenditures as the basis for
measuring ability to pay tax. In this Article, Professor Graetz ex-
amines the practical problems of implementing and administering a
progressive consumption tax as an alternative to the income tax. He
concludes that although a consumption tax is feasible, practical imple-
mentation difficulties, together with the political unlikelihood of
enacting a tax which is both administratively workable and retains
the alleged theoretical advantages of a consumption-based tax, argue
against its adoption.
ATHOUGH the idea of an individualized tax on consump-
tion is not new,1 it has received no serious political attention
in the United States since the Second World War.' Recent years,
however, have witnessed a variety of proposals to substitute such
an "expenditure tax" for the existing income tax. Proponents of
a progressive personal consumption tax have asserted its superior-
* Professor of Law and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, and
Professor of Law, University of Southern California.
This Article is a revised version of a paper originally prepared at the request
of the Brookings Institution for an October, 1978, Conference on the Graduated
Expenditure Tax, the proceedings of which are separately published in WHAT
SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE (J. Pechman ed. 1979). The author
has benefited from the comments of participants at that conference. In addition,
the comments of William Andrews and Alvin Warren on earlier drafts of this
Article and the research of Mark Isaacs, Tom Palfrey, Larry Fullerton, and
Lynne Schlinger were especially helpful. This Article is published with the
permission of the Brookings Institution and the Fund for Public Policy Re-
search, both of which provided financial support. The views expressed herein
are the author's own and do not necessarily represent those of the sponsoring
institutions.
I See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 226 (M. Oakeshott ed. I96O) ; J.S. MiL,, PRNxcirnEs
Or POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. V, ch. I, § 4 (Laughlin ed. 1884). The classic work is
N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURL TAX (x955). See also, e.g., I. FIsHER & H. FISHER,
CoNsTRucTm INCOME TAXATION (1942); A. Marshall, The Equitable Distribu-
tion of Taxation, in MFmoRALs OF ALFRED MARSHALL 347, 350-51 (A. Pigou ed.
X925); A. Pioou, A STUDY 3N PUBLIC FINANCE 102-03 (3d rev. ed. 1949).
I See U.S. DP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY 93-94, 411-13, 415 (I943).
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ity to the income tax in terms of fairness, economic efficiency,
and simplicity of administration.' Not surprisingly, each of these
contentions is quite controversial.
The debate over the relative equity of income and expen-
diture taxation has considered whether income or consumption
is a better measure of "ability to pay," I whether horizontal
equity should be measured by reference to similarly situated earn-
ers or similarly situated consumers, 5 and what time frame should
be used to evaluate the fairness of a progressive tax on individ-
uals.' In more general terms, the debate has asked whether social
product in the form of money returns to both capital and labor
(income) is a fairer tax base than what an individual takes out
of society in the form of money spent on consumption.7
Claims for consumption taxation based on economic efficiency
have likewise produced lively debate.8 There is general agreement
' The seminal work is Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974). See also ADVISORY Commia. ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE EXPENDITURE TAX (Information Report M-84
1974) [hereinafter cited as ACIR REPORT]; INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE
STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION (1978) [hereinafter cited as the
MEADE REPORT]; S. LODIN, PROGRESSIVE EXPENDITURE TAX-AN ALTERNATIVE?
(0978) (report of the X972 [Swedish] Government Commission on Taxation)
(translated into English in 1978); P. Mixszxowsxi, THE CASH FLOW VERsION
OF AN EXPENDITURE TAX (May 1977) (Office of Tax Analysis, OTA Paper 26, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX
REFORM 21-52, 113-44 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINTS].
4 See Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor
Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975); Bradford, The Case for a Personal Ex-
penditure Tax, in WHAT SHoUILD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE (J, Pech-
man ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BRooxINGs REPORT]; Dyer, The Relative
Fairness of the Consumption and Accretion Tax Bases, 1978 UTAH L. REV.
457; Goode, The Case for the Income Tax, in BROoxiuGs REPORT, supra;
Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 370 (1979); Warren,
Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 931 (i975); Warren, Comments on The Case for the Income Tax (by
Richard Goode) and The Case for a Personal Expenditure Tax (by David F.
Bradford), in BRooXINos REPORT, supra; Warren, Income and Consumption
Taxes-The Issue of Fairness (forthcoming 1979).
a Compare Andrews, supra note 4, with Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975).
3 Consumption tax proponents tend to take a lifetime perspective and an
ex ante view in evaluating issues of fairness, see I. FISHER & H. FISHER, supra
note I, at 95-98; BLUEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 24-25, 176; Bradford, supra note 4;
Bradford & Toder, Consumption vs. Income Base Taxes: The Argument on
Grounds of Equity and Simplicity, 69 NAT'L TAX A. PROC. 25 (976), while in-
come tax proponents tend to rely on a shorter time frame and ex post com-
parisons, see Warren, Income and Consumption Taxes-The Issues of Fairness
(forthcoming 1979).
' Compare Warren, supra note 6, with I. FISHER & H. FISHER, supra note I,
at 92-105.
1 See Boskin, Taxation, Saving and the Rate of Interest, 86 J. POL. ECON.
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that a consumption tax inherently leads to fewer difficulties than
an income tax in times of significant inflation, and that a consump-
tion tax provides more evenhanded treatment of present and
postponed consumption by eliminating the so-called double tax
on savings.' But economists differ widely in their predictions
about the effects of treating savings more favorably. The eco-
nomic consequences will essentially depend upon the relative re-
sponsiveness of savings and labor to changes in after-tax interest
and wages. The empirical work in this area has as yet been in-
conclusive.' 0
In contrast to these disagreements about equity and efficiency,
recent commentators have generally agreed that an expenditure
tax would be easier to administer than the income tax." Although
expenditure taxation has failed in the only two countries that have
tried it -India and Sri Lanka -these failures are deemed of
little relevance to the United States because of the sophisticated
progressive income tax based upon self-assessment that already
exists here. This Article will consider whether implementation
and administration of an expenditure tax would in fact be
sufficiently feasible to make such a tax deserving of real political
attention, and will consider equity and efficiency only as these as-
serted advantages of an expenditure tax are implicated in the prac-
tical problems of implementation.
After a brief description in Part I of how an expenditure tax
would operate, Part II will explore the type of rate schedule
that would be necessary under an expenditure tax. Part III will
discuss what items would be included in receipts and allowed as
deductions, and Part IV will consider the timing of inclusions and
deductions. Parts V, VI, VII, and VIII will suggest some of the
implications of an expenditure tax for taxation of gifts and be-
quests, tax incentives and subsidies, corporate taxation, and in-
ternational transactions, respectively. Finally, Part IX will
analyze transitional problems likely to arise in shifting to an ex-
penditure tax.
While demonstrating that workable solutions can be devised
S3 (1978) ; Bradford, supra note 4; Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income
Taxation, 86 J. PoL. ECON. S29, $37-$39 (1978); Howrey & Hymans, The Mea-
surement and Determination of Loanable Funds Saving, in BROoKINcS REPORT,
supra note 4.
1 See Goode, The Economic Definition of Income, in COmPREH sIvE INcomE
TAXATION i, ii (J. Pechman ed. i977); Kahn, The Place of Consumption and
Net-Worth Taxation in the Federal Tax Structure, in BROAD-BASED TAXES 133,
139-40 (R. Musgrave ed. 1973). See generally sources cited note i supra.
'0 See sources cited note 8 supra.
" See sources cited note 3 supra. Contra, N. KALDOR, supra note i, at 222;
Brazer, The Income Tax in the Federal Revenue System, in BRoAD-BAsED TAXES
3, 5 (R. Musgrave ed. 1973).
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for the major issues arising under an expenditure tax, the Article
suggests that the implementation problems posed by the shift to
a consumption-based tax are indeed serious and emphasizes the
need for caution in moving forward with this tax as an alternative
to the income tax. Many of the alleged fairness and efficiency
advantages of a theoretically correct expenditure tax are likely
to be lost in the political process, if income tax experience is any
indication. Areas in which the design and implementation of an
expenditure tax are likely to prove particularly troublesome are
coordination with the tax systems of other industrial nations and
the creation of an acceptable and compatible replacement for
the corporate income tax. Further difficulties are posed by the
likely need for high nominal rates, for new or increased wealth
or transfer taxes, for tax subsidies for particular kinds of invest-
ment, and for a comprehensive base of receipts and consumption.
The treatment of gifts and bequests will also be problematic.
Finally, although this Article suggests, contrary to the view of
most commentators, that devices are available to make the transi-
tion to an expenditure tax relatively simple without undue un-
fairness to taxpayers, the political likelihood of enacting a simple
transitional scheme is very slight.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Comparison to Other Taxes
Consumption taxes in the United States and other industrial-
ized countries tend to take the form not of expenditure taxes, but
instead of flat-rate or multiple-rate retail sales taxes, turnover
taxes, or value-added taxes.12 Like the expenditure tax, these taxes
are imposed upon a base composed of expenditures on consump-
tion items. The principal difficulties with the value-added tax
and the sales tax are precisely those which a well-designed ex-
penditure tax should avoid. First, value-added and retail sales
taxes are invariably imposed on less than a full consumption base.
Services are typically excluded from the tax base, for example,
medical and hospital care services provided by state and local
governments, public transportation, financial services provided
by banks and savings institutions, foreign travel, and in some
cases rental payments, including those for housing. 13 Second,
2See generally 3. DUE, SALEs TAXATION (1957); D. Sram, J. WaFBER &
C. CERF, WHAT You SHouLD KNOW ABOUT TICE VALUE ADDED TAx 11-21 (971);
Cohen, Foreign Experience with a Value Added Tax, 24 NAT'L TAx J. 399 (971).
13See J. DUE, supra note 12, at 373-78.
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value-added or retail sales tax rates are not related to an individ-
ual's total amount of consumption. An expenditure tax should
avoid the narrowing of the tax base that inevitably seems to
accompany value-added or sales taxes and would achieve in-
dividualization of the tax burden by imposing a tax on a con-
sumption base at progressive rates directly related to an individ-
ual's overall level of consumption.
If only a proportional tax on consumption were desired, a
value-added tax or a retail sales tax would surely be adequate,
since relatively simple mechanisms exist to ensure that these
taxes are roughly proportional to an individual's total consump-
tion.'4 The decision to adopt a progressive rate structure is thus
the principal basis for choosing an expenditure tax over other
taxes levied on a consumption base. The fact that the decision
to impose an expenditure tax is, in the first instance, dictated by
a desire for progressivity needs to be emphasized because much
of the expenditure tax literature analyzes fiat-rate taxes.15 Dif-
ficulties with such analysis will become apparent in subsequent
sections of this Article.
An expenditure tax at progressive rates also overlaps sub-
stantially with a progressive income tax, as the Haig-Simons
definition of income as consumption plus accretions to wealth
suggests.' A significant portion of the income tax base is com-
prised of consumption expenditures, and many of the problems
of implementing a consumption tax are quite similar, or even
identical, to those encountered under an income tax. Because
sixty years of experience with and analysis of income tax issues
must necessarily serve as background to any discussion of im-
plementation issues under an expenditure tax, this Article will
concentrate on issues peculiar to an expenditure tax, with only
abbreviated discussion of issues which have been explored in
depth in the income tax context.
Finally, Professor Alvin Warren has suggested that a con-
sumption tax is necessarily equivalent to a wage tax.", This argu-
ment requires one to ask whether a graduated payroll tax, perhaps
with a base similar to that of the social security tax, would be an
appropriate mechanism for implementation of an expenditure
tax. This alternative will be explored in Part IV in connection
with discussion of the two principal forms of consumption tax
implementation.
"" See id. at 373-82.
15 Andrews, supra note 3, at 112o-28, ix5o; see BLuEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 9,
127-28. See also Klein, Timing in Personal Taxation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1977).
'
6 H. SIMONS, PERSONAL Icom TAXATION 5o (1938).
17 Warren, supra note 5, at 938.
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B. General Description of an Expenditure Tax
No one suggests direct accounting for consumption expend-
itures of individuals as a practical approach to a progressive
tax on consumption. Recordkeeping in connection with numerous
consumption purchases would simply be too onerous; Internal
Revenue Service reliance on sales tax tables under the current
income tax confirms this rather obvious point. Consumption
expenditures would necessarily be approximated by reference to
amounts available for consumption (principally income) and
amounts saved.
Early discussions of expenditure tax implementation typically
regarded full reporting of an individual's bank balances, other
accounts, and assets and liabilities at the beginning and end of
each year as essential to the consumption tax computation,'8 but
subsequent commentators have viewed balance sheet reporting as
unnecessarily complicating.'" Instead, consumption expenditures
would be computed indirectly by calculating each year's transac-
tions which produce funds available for consumption or savings
and eliminating savings from the tax base. Subsequent Parts of
this Article will fill in the details, but the general form would be
as follows: Amounts Received minus Amounts Saved equals
Taxable Consumption.
II. THE EXPENDITURE TAX RATE SCHEDULE
A. In General
While the development of a specific rate schedule for an ex-
penditure tax is beyond the scope of this Article, the details of
the rate schedule have important implications for issues of ex-
penditure tax design. Enactment of an expenditure tax could
serve various purposes. It might be enacted as a replacement
for one or more current sources of federal revenue, for example,
the individual income tax (or both the individual and corporate
income tax), payroll taxes, or estate and gift taxes (if gifts and
bequests are treated as donors' consumption). Alternatively, an
expenditure tax could be adopted as a supplement to existing tax
sources, perhaps limited in application to high income taxpayers. 0
18 See N. KALDOR, supra note i, at x91-93; Kelley, Is an Expenditure Tax Feas-
ible?, 23 NATI' TAX J. 237, 238-42 (i970); Slitor, Administrative Aspects of Ex-
penditure Taxation, in BROAD-BASED TAXES 227, 251-55 (R. Musgrave ed. 1973).
'9 See BLUEPRMITS, supra note 3, at I13-14, ri9; Andrews, supra note 3, at Iiig,
x149--O.
2 See N. KALDOR, supra note i, at 224-32; Andrews, supra note 3, at ix85-88;
Andrews, A Supplemental Personal Expenditure Tax, in Baooxins REPoRT, supra
[Vol. 92:1575158o
Taxes on a consumption base have from time to time been
suggested to finance specific federal programs. For example,
Congressman Al Ullman, Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, has recently suggested that a national health
insurance program might be financed by a value-added tax, and
Senator Russell Long, Chairman of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, has proposed a value-added tax to replace social security
taxes and to reduce income taxes.2 An expenditure tax might
well merit consideration in such contexts.
The Treasury Department, in its study of a progressive con-
sumption tax in Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, estimated that
a rather comprehensive consumption tax base would be 23%
greater than the present taxable income base and 7% less than
a comprehensive income tax base.22 A comprehensive consump-
tion tax base would be larger than the present income tax base
because the addition of many items not now included as income
would more than offset the exclusion of amounts saved. For
example, capital gains would be included in full, and the Treasury
would not allow deductions for charitable contributions or state
sales or property taxes.
The Treasury's calculations notwithstanding, it is of course
quite possible that the expenditure tax emerging from the political
process might not significantly expand the present tax base, so
that the major modification of the present tax base would be the
exclusion of savings. If this were the case, and total revenues
and distribution of the tax burden roughly equivalent to that of
the present income tax were desired, a rate schedule much more
sharply progressive than the current schedule might be required.
The existing rate schedule for married couples ranges from 14%
at taxable incomes of $3,400-$5,5oo to 70% at taxable incomes
in excess of $215,400.22 If, as is widely believed, persons in
lower income brackets annually consume more than their in-
come, and the proportion of income allocated to savings increases
with income, comparable rate schedules applied to a consumption
tax base would tend to start lower than those of the current
income tax and rise more gradually than current income tax
rates until about the $3o,ooo taxable income class; over that
note 4. The recent report of the Meade Commission in the United Kingdom,
for example, considered a "two-tier" expenditure tax with a proportional value-
added tax applicable to the broad class of taxpayers and a progressive expenditure
tax applicable only at the higher brackets. See MEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at
204-15. But see p. 1655 & note 225 infra.21See Daily Tax Report for Executives (BNA), Apr. 30, 1979, at G-6; 7 TAx
NoTms 685, 705-06 (,978).
22 BL EPRI Rs, supra note 3, at i69.
2 I.R.C. § x(a).
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amount, rates would tend to rise steeply and to be at a level
greater than that of current marginal income tax rates.24
Alternatively, distribution of the tax burden and revenues
equal to the income tax could be achieved by combining an ex-
penditure tax with another new tax, such as a wealth tax, or
increases in other existing taxes. Attention would of course have
to be given to the effect of such additional changes on the greater
efficiency and equity claimed for the expenditure tax and on the
feasibility of implementation. Moreover, the alleged efficiency
and equity advantages of an expenditure tax may themselves be
quite sensitive to the rate schedule for the tax. Sharply pro-
gressive rates, for example, may significantly affect the choice
between present and future consumption, and tax-exclusive mar-
ginal rates in excess of ioo% may reduce any impact of the
change in increasing aggregate savings.
In analyzing problems of implementing a progressive tax on
consumption, this Article assumes that such a tax is intended to
produce revenues roughly equivalent to current federal income
tax receipts and to distribute the tax burden in a manner roughly
similar to that of the current income tax, through a rate schedule
having numerous gradations.
B. A Tax-Exclusive Base - Deduction of
Federal Expenditure Taxes
Under the income tax, tax is imposed on a "tax-inclusive"
basis; tax payments are treated in the same manner as amounts
saved. No deduction is allowed for the income tax itself. Under
an expenditure tax, treating tax payments in the same manner as
amounts saved requires deduction for tax payments on a cash-
flow basis - a "tax-exclusive" base - so that the movement of
funds from savings to pay taxes would not affect the actual
amount of taxes due. One major effect of the choice between
24 Regardless of the base selected, it seems unrealistic to expect rate brackets as
broad as the Treasury suggests in Blueprints. In its proposed rate schedule (which
it contended would roughly approximate the progressivity of present law), for
example, the Treasury suggests one marginal rate (28%) for married couples with
consumption between $5,200 and $3o,ooo and one marginal rate (407) for
consumption in excess of $3oooo. BLuEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 169. Present law
contains seven different marginal tax rates for taxable income classes between $5,2oo
and $3oo0o, and eight different marginal rates for taxable incomes in excess of
$3o,ooo. I.R.C. § i (a). It seems more reasonable to assume that, whatever the con-
sumption tax base, a progressive rate schedule would include considerably more
graduations than that suggested in Blueprints. The number of brackets has signifi-
cant implications for implementation decisions. Under the Blueprints schedule, the
few graduations may make the allocation of consumption to a particular taxable
period extremely significant for persons with consumption near the amounts where
the brackets shift.
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tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive bases is on the rate of tax to be
applied. Significantly greater rates are required to produce equiv-
alent revenues on a tax-exclusive base, as the following table
illustrates: 25
Equivalent
Tax-Inclusive Rates Tax-Exclusive Rates
35 54
40 66 2/3
50 100
75 300
83 488
98 4,900
Although actual tax liability need not be increased, the psy-
chological and political consequences of the choice between a
tax-inclusive or tax-exclusive base may prove quite disadvan-
tageous to the adoption of an expenditure tax. A 75% tax on a
base that includes the tax may be viewed differently than a
300% tax on a base that does not include the tax. It might
be possible to overcome the appearance of a tax increase by a
mathematical maneuver that would describe tax liability in terms
of a tax-inclusive rate schedule but allow actual computations to
be performed on a tax-exclusive basis.
In any event, it is important that an expenditure tax actually
be calculated on a tax-exclusive base. In the first place, failure
to treat payments of expenditure tax as deductible would create
oscillations in the amount of tax due depending on the timing of
tax payments as compared with amounts saved. To the extent
that taxpayers adjust their savings to meet tax liabilities, a tax-
exclusive expenditure tax base will tend to produce more stable
results.26 Second, divergence between current payments of tax
(through withholding or through estimated tax payments) and
final tax liability would create special problems under an ex-
penditure tax imposed on a tax-inclusive basis. If the govern-
ment withheld too little, for example, a taxpayer could devote
to savings amounts that would otherwise be taxable and thereby
reduce his tax liability." If, on the other hand, the government
2 5 The table in the text is taken from the MEAE REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
The general formula for converting tax-exclusive into tax-inclusive rates and
vice versa is:
rt r.
re = - 17 ; ri= . --
where r, is the tax-inclusive rate and r. is the tax-exclusive rate.2 6 See id. at 167. See also N. KALDOR, supra note 3, at 237-38.
27 While the problem is not limited to divergences between amounts withheld
and final tax liability, a simple example of underwithholding will illustrate the
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withheld too much, a taxpayer would have no opportunity to
diminish his tax burden in similar fashion. Imposing expenditure
tax on a tax-exclusive base would eliminate these problems.
III. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPENDITURE
TAX BASE: RECEIPTS AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Introduction
Computation of the expenditure tax base requires deduction
of amounts saved or invested from amounts available for con-
sumption, with the balance treated as consumption expenditures.
For many taxpayers, receipts and deductions would be treated
much as they are under the current income tax, except that cash
receipts from sales of assets would be fully included and savings
fully deducted. In practical terms, however, it may be more
critical under a consumption tax that receipts available for con-
sumption be comprehensively defined, and that deductions of
amounts properly considered consumption not be allowed.
As the previous Part suggests, because of the exclusion of
savings, a consumption tax may require higher and more steeply
progressive marginal rates to produce the same revenue as the
current income tax. If this proved to be the case, taxpayers would
have a greater incentive to avoid tax by overstating deductions
or by obtaining funds for consumption in ways which do not give
rise to taxable receipts. And quite apart from whether rates are
higher or lower, preventing such tax avoidance would likely be-
come more important since tax planners would likely concentrate
their energies on concealing consumption. These pressures will
advantage to taxpayers under" a tax-inclusive computation of delaying payment
of expenditure taxes and temporarily increasing savings. Assume a taxpayer with
salary of $ioo and after-tax consumption of $5o with expenditure tax of 50%
on a tax-inclusive base. If no amount of tax were withheld, but the taxpayer
put $50 in a savings account, a tax-inclusive computation would produce an ex-
penditure tax liability of $25 for that year (since the tax base would be $1oo
receipts minus $50 savings). This tax liability presumably would be paid by with-
drawing the $25 from savings in the following year. Since no deduction for ex-
penditure tax would be allowed in a tax-inclusive system, the individual's tax lia-
bility would increase in future years: by $12.50 in year 2 (5o% of the $25 addi-
tional receipts withdrawn from savings to pay taxes), $6.25 in year 3 (5o% of the
$12.5o additional receipts withdrawn from savings in year 3 to pay expenditure
tax), and so on. In contrast, an individual subject to accurate withholding of
$50 in year i would owe tax of $5o for that year ($xoo of receipts and no deduc-
tion for savings).
A tax-exclusive computation, on the other hand, would allow deduction for
expenditure tax payments and, with a rate of oo%, produce an identical tax of
$50 in year i whether taxes were withheld or saved. More detailed examples may
be found in MEAD REPORT, supra note 3, at 162-67.
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require a broad definition of consumption to prevent serious
erosion of the tax base.
This Part explores several significant areas of potential ex-
clusion and deduction which present issues under an expenditure
tax parallel to those arising under the income tax. Although the
issues considered here have been well ventilated in the income
tax context,28 differences between income and expenditure taxation
will, in some instances, produce important variations in the an-
alysis.
i. Receipts. -Notwithstanding the differences between ex-
penditure tax receipts and income, the concepts are more similar
than they are different. All items includible as income under the
income tax would constitute receipts available for consumption
under an expenditure tax. As Part IV explains, proceeds from
sales of assets and from loans will typically be included in ex-
penditure tax receipts. For many taxpayers, however, expend-
iture tax receipts and income in most years would be identical;
this would be true, for example, where individuals receive only
wages, interest, and dividends.
The following discussion proceeds from the premise that an
expenditure tax should include all items in the tax base that can
reasonably be viewed as satisfying personal needs and desires.
Although such a perspective might theoretically merge into sug-
gestions for taxation of leisure, prestige, or other intangible forms
of personal satisfaction, this Article does not advocate extending
taxation that far. Since shifting to an expenditure tax will neces-
sarily result in a narrowing of the tax base, however, it will be
more important to ensure that items within that base do not escape
taxation.
2. Deductions. - An expenditure tax must distinguish as
precisely as possible between nondeductible consumption ex-
penditures and deductible expenditures for savings or investment.
In some circumstances, the distinction is relatively easy to draw.
For example, money spent on goods and services for the sole
purpose of personal pleasure is plainly consumption. By the same
token, if an individual deposits $ioo in a savings account with
a financial institution, the deposit just as plainly constitutes
savings. Likewise, the purchase of stock in the hope of obtain-
ing a return offers a clear case of investment. Many individual
expenditures, however, are made with mixed motives. Money is
often spent at once to provide personal satisfaction and to make
11 See, e.g., B. BITTKER, C. GALVINq, R. MusrRAvE & J. PECu.Ax, A CoiPRE-
HENSivE INCOME TAx BASE? (1968) ; COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAxAT N (J. Pech-
man ed. x977).
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money; the same expenditure often has both investment and
consumption aspects.
The practical problems of distinguishing between personal
expenses and expenses made for business or investment purposes
are familiar under the income tax. Professor Chirelstein ac-
curately assesses the magnitude of the tax collector's task when
he observes that "the notion of a sharp division between pleasure-
seeking and profit-seeking is alien to human psychology and es-
sentially unrealistic." 29
In some instances, the Internal Revenue Code permits deduc-
tions for expenses without requiring the taxpayer to show any
profit-seeking motive. These include the so-called itemized deduc-
tions for charitable contributions, medical expenses, interest, and
state and local taxes. In other cases, the taxpayer must demon-
strate a business or profit-seeking motive to obtain a deduction.
Given the difficulties under the income tax of resolving these
issues, there is no reason to expect that expenditure tax rules will
be more satisfactory. This Part attempts to suggest practical
solutions (given the likely political pressures) and, in keeping
with the recommendations relating to receipts, argues for limiting
deductions where expenses are induced by mixed personal and
business investment motives.
B. Business-Related Consumption
x. Fringe Benefits. - The existing ability of certain taxpayers
to obtain fringe benefits free of income tax 1o violates principles
of tax equity and produces allocative inefficiences since both em-
20 M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 87 (I977). Professor Bittker
has remarked on this dilemma in greater detail:
No matter how generously the Code defines business expenses in an effort
to insure that all business-related expenses can be deducted, there will al-
ways be some non-deductible items beyond the line that contribute in some
way to the production of income, whether it is the basic cost of living -
one cannot work, after all, unless one is fed and housed -or the cost of
luxuries that contribute to the taxpayer's willingness to work and to his in-
itiative and reliability while on the job. On the other hand, no matter how
severely the term "business expense" is defined, many items will continue
to qualify for deduction although they confer "personal" benefits on the
taxpayer. Taxpayers may be forbidden to deduct entertainment expenses
because they are suspected of enjoying dinners and theater parties with
their business customers, for example, but even the most puritanical defini-
tion of business expense is not likely to prevent self-employed taxpayers
from deducting the cost of air-conditioning their offices, upholstering their
swivel chairs, or adding gadgets to their telephones, even if they derive
personal pleasure from these amenities.
Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expendi-
tures, 16 J.L. & EcoN. 193, 203-04 (1973).
20See, e.g., I.R.C. § iig (exclusion for value of meals or lodging furnished
for the convenience of the employer); 2 C.B. 90 (1920) (supper money ruling);
Treas. Reg. § I.II7-4(c)(2) (i956) (tuition remission regulation).
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ployees and employers find it expedient to fashion compensation
in the form of excluded in-kind benefits.31 Under an expenditure
tax, it would be highly desirable to avoid much of the attrition
of the tax base occasioned by the current exclusion of essentially
compensatory in-kind benefits.32 Items such as supper money,
employee discounts, free admission to athletic or entertainment
events, vacation facilities and country club memberships, meals
and lodging, and interest-free loans would be includible in expend-
iture tax receipts.3 Particular care would have to be exercised
to prevent highly compensated individuals from structuring their
remuneration so as to receive a maximum amount of compensa-
tion in the form of fringe benefits. Otherwise, the same classes of
persons principally able to reduce taxes by deductions for savings
would also obtain a disproportionate exemption of consumption,
and the prospect of genuine progressivity would be undermined.
Taxation of fringe benefits would not be easy under an ex-
penditure tax, either as a political or administrative matter, given
the inertia of the existing exclusions and the difficulties posed by
recordkeeping and withholding.3 4 The only practical alternative,
"1 See generally Tax Treatment of Employee Fringe Benefits: Hearings of the
Task Force on Employer Fringe Benefits Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Grief, Analysis of Treasury Proposals on
Fringe Benefits: Are They Rules of the Future?, 45 J. TAx. 96 (1976); Hickman,
The Outlook for Fringe Benefits, 29 S. CAL. TAx INsT. 459 (1977); Special Comm.
on Simplification, ABA Section of Taxation, Evaluation of the Proposed Model
Comprehensive Income Tax, 32 TAx LAw. 567 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
ABA Simplification Report]; Wainess, Current Trends in Executive Fringe Bene-
fits, 30 S. CAL. TAx IN sT. 319 (1978); Note, Federal Income Taxation of Em-
ployee Fringe Benefits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1976).
"See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Discussion Draft of Proposed Regulations on
Fringe Benefits, 40 Fed. Reg. 41118 (1975). A substantial noncompensatory
business purpose for providing to an employee the good or service in question
should be a prerequisite for exclusion, i.e., the familiar working-condition/
benefit-of-the-employer doctrine should be strictly applied. The viability of
any fringe benefit taxation system seems to require that employers withhold tax on
amounts thus includible in employees' receipts, or at a minimum notify employees
as to amounts of taxable fringe benefits. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 29 (1978), however,
suggests that a greater degree of certainty is required for withholding than for in-
cluding amounts in income, and may undermine any scheme to tax fringe benefits
via withholding.
"3 The alternative of disallowing business deductions to employers would not
be available, since a decision to tax consumption implies the elimination of business
income taxes which affect production, but it might be possible to impose a special
excise tax on fringe benefits which are difficult to allocate to individual employees.
Business taxation is discussed in Part V, infra.
In 1978, Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 95-427, 92 Stat. 996, which pre-
cluded the IRS from issuing any new fringe benefit regulations prior to January
i, 198o. A special task force of the House Ways and Means Committee also was
formed to study the fringe benefit problem. The task force's preliminary views
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however, seems to be the unwarranted exclusion of such items
from the consumption tax base, which seems even less acceptable
than under an income tax.
2. The Distinction Between Business and Personal Ex-
penses. - Similar issues are presented by the deduction for busi-
ness expenses. One employee's fringe benefit may, for example,
constitute a business deduction for a self-employed individual.
Under the income tax the statutory standards are quite general,
and the struggle to distinguish deductible business or investment
expenses from nondeductible personal, family, or living expenses
has been largely left to the Internal Revenue Service and the
courts. Sections 162 and 212 of the Internal Revenue Code
provide for the deduction of "all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses" incurred in carrying on any trade or business or other
income-producing activities, while section 262 states that "no
deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
Beyond these general principles, Congress has provided little guid-
ance in distinguishing business and investment expenses from
consumption expenditures.
A variety of standards have developed, depending upon the
particular type of expense involved. 5 For some kinds of ex-
penses, the courts ask only whether the expense is appropriate
and helpful to the taxpayer's business; if it is, the taxpayer is
allowed a deduction." For other expenses, courts attempt to
discern the objective motive of the taxpayer, disallowing a deduc-
tion unless the expense would not have been made "but for" the
existence of the business or investment motive.37 The courts
ordinarily will require that a taxpayer's profit-seeking activities
be undertaken in "good faith." " Some types of expenses are
regarded by courts as "inherently personal," "I and nondeductible
even if shown to enhance profitmaking activity.
A useful general approach to the business deduction problem
were summarized in a discussion draft bill. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
96Tu CONG., IST SEss., DiscussioN DRArr BILL AND REPORT ON EMPLOYEE FRINGE
BENEFITS (Comm. Print 1979). See also sources cited note 31 supra.
" See generally Halperin, Business Deductions for Personal Living Expenses:
A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859 (2974).
36 See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. i1 (1933).
"'See, e.g., Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973) (commuting ex-
penses); Rev. Rul. 75-380, 1975-2 C.B. 59.
38 See, e.g., Crymes v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 4 (1972); Shiosaki
v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) iro (1971), aff'd, 475 F.2d 770 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 4X4 U.S. 830 (i973).
11 See, e.g., Fred W. Amend Co. v. Commissioner, 454 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1971)
(company president's consultations with Christian Science practitioner); Drake v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 842 (1969) (army enlisted man's haircuts); Rev. Rul.
70-474, i970-2 C.B. 34 (work clothes, uniforms, and grooming).
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under the expenditure tax would focus not on the taxpayer's
motivation or potential business benefits, but instead on the con-
sumption aspects of such expenditures. Deductions would be
disallowed to the extent that immediate personal benefits are
enjoyed, 40 while costs associated with deferred consumption would
be deductible as saving. Deductions for travel, meals, lodging,
and entertainment, for example, would be more limited than under
the current income tax. On the other hand, items such as educa-
tional expenses, job-seeking expenses, and legal expenses which
do not tend to provide current consumption benefits would prob-
ably be more generally deductible than under the income tax.
A review of the current treatment of legal expenses may help
to illustrate how an expenditure tax might modify the courts'
income tax approach to certain kinds of business expense issues.4"
40 See Halperin, supra note 35 (suggesting such an approach to business de-
ductions for personal expenses under an income tax). Under this approach, if
personal satisfaction is equal to or greater than cost, no deduction would be
allowed; in other cases, a deduction would be permitted only to the extent that
cost exceeds the personal benefits from the expense. Recognizing the practical
difficulties of distinguishing personal consumption from profit-motivated expenses,
Professor Halperin suggests the following rules of thumb which are useful as a
guide to implementation decisions under an expenditure tax:
[i) Education: Allow amortization of the cost of professional and certain
other postgraduate education and vocational training after high school.
[2) Job seeking: Allow a deduction for, or amortization of, job-seeking
costs not involving travel or education.
[3] Clothing: No change in present law. [Deductible only if required as
a condition of employment and not adaptable to ordinary wear.).
[4] Office in the home: Deny a deduction unless the principal purpose of
acquiring the space is business ...
[5] Travel: [D]eduction[s] permitted would be in the ratio of time
spent on business to total time on the trip. . . . Consideration should be
given to whether a deduction can be fully denied for certain trips, e.g.,
conventions at vacation spots, which appear to result in personal satisfac-
tion equal to cost. If so, meals and lodging on such occasions also should
not be deductible.
[6] Food: Deny all deductions [or at a minimum] do not allow a de-
duction for food consumed in the home or for lunches wherever they take
place [and] [p]lace a low dollar limit on deductions for breakfast and
dinner ...
[7] Lodging: Deny a deduction unless lodging duplicates housing other-
wise available and in all cases for days not spent on business. A dollar limit
should apply.
[8] Entertainment: Deny any deduction.
Id. at 932. See also Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a
Combination Business and Pleasure Trip-A Conceptual Analysis, i8 STAN. L.
REv. io99 (1966).
In addition to the issues mentioned above, expenditure tax rules would be
needed to deal with so-called bobby loss investments, another area in which in-
dividuals seek to obtain personal satisfaction in the guise of profit-seeking activities.
The treatment of such activities under current income tax law has generally been
quite unsatisfactory and would be inadequate to ensure the inclusion of a proper
amount of consumption in the expenditure tax base.
41 The analysis of the appropriate expenditure tax treatment of legal expenses
presented here is generally consistent with income tax arguments advanced in
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The basic income tax rule is set forth in United States v. Gil-
more," where an individual attempted to deduct legal expenses
incurred in defending a divorce action in which his wife claimed
ownership of a controlling interest in the family business. The
taxpayer argued that such expenses were deductible because they
were incurred for the conservation of income-producing property.
The Supreme Court concluded that deductibility turned not on
the potential consequences of the divorce action on the defend-
ant's property, but on "the origin and character of the claim
with respect to which an expense was incurred." 4' The Court
held that the wife's claim stemmed from the marital relationship
and that the taxpayer's expenses incurred in defending the claim
were therefore personal and not deductible.
In a subsequent proceeding involving the same taxpayer, how-
ever, a district court held that the attorney's fees incurred in
defending the divorce action were costs of defending title to the
taxpayer's property and, even though not deductible, could be
added to the property's basis.44 Moreover, divorced spouses are
typically allowed to deduct legal expenses incurred for the col-
lection of alimony even though these expenses originate in a
personal context.45 On the other hand, application of the "origin
of the claim" test of Gilmore has led courts to conclude that legal
fees incurred in preparing a will are nondeductible personal ex-
penses, as are a legatee's expenses in contesting a will.40
In addition to the basic distinction between personal and busi-
ness investment expenses, there is a significant income tax timing
issue involved when expenditures are made with regard to prop-
erty. For example, capitalization rather than deduction should
be required of expenses incurred to perfect title to property be-
cause the benefits of successful litigation will obtain throughout
the period of ownership. Under an expenditure tax, the timing
issue disappears, and expenses should be deductible unless the
payments can be fairly treated as consumption. If in Gilmore
the issue were posed in terms of whether the legal expenses
constituted consumption, a different answer might be forthcom-
ing. If the expenses were costs of rearranging ownership of prop-
Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of Personal Property under the Internal
Revenue Code, 23 STAx. L. REV. 454, 469-71 (I97x). Legal expenses are only
one example of the different treatment potentially required under an expenditure
tax. See also Bittker, Reflections on Tax Reform, 47 U. CN. L. REv. z8g, 195-
200 (1978) (discussing child care expenses).
42372 U.S. 39 (1963).
'
3 1d. at 49.
14 Gilmore v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (NfD. Cal. 1965). See generally
Epstein, supra note 41, at 457-62.
" See Wild v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 7o6 (1964), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 4.
46 See, e.g., Merians v. Commissioner, 6o T.C. 187 (1973), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 2.
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erty within a family group - which would include the preparation
or contest of wills as well as divorce settlements - this would
seem not to be consumption, but rather a prelude to consumption
(which will occur when the new owner sells the property). Such
costs of deferring consumption are generally treated as savings
and should thus be deductible under an expenditure tax. By the
same token, expenses incurred in defending lawsuits might nor-
mally be deductible under an expenditure tax without inquiring,
as under the income tax, whether, for example, the expenses were
incurred to protect the taxpayer's reputation,4 7 whether they were
incurred in criminal rather than civil proceedings,48 or whether
they were incurred to acquire or to protect title to business or
personal property.4 9 In no event would such legal expenses prop-
erly be viewed as consumption.
This brief discussion of legal expenses is intended principally
to illustrate that income tax precedents which distinguish personal
from business or investment expenses might be reexamined under
an expenditure tax. Courts faced with expenditure tax issues
would likely tend to resolve them by inquiring whether a par-
ticular expenditure can fairly be characterized as an expense of
immediate rather than of deferred consumption (or a loss). If
this approach were adopted, many expenditures made in connec-
tion with property ownership which are not now deductible under
the income tax would be deductible under an expenditure tax.
C. Itemized Deductions and Other
Exclusions from Income
With respect to a number of deductions and exclusions, the
issues likely to arise under an expenditure tax are essentially
identical to those encountered under the income tax. Although
resolution of these issues would continue to depend in large part
on the debate between comprehensive taxation and pursuit of
extrinsic policy objectives, the shift to an expenditure tax would
introduce several important differences.
i. Charitable Contributions, Medical Expenses, and State and
Local Taxes.- The income tax deduction for contributions to
educational, religious, and scientific institutions 50 is likely to per-
"
7 See Draper v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 201 (1956), acq. 1956-2 C.B. 5 (de-
duction allowed for litigation expenses incurred to protect professional reputation).
But see Lloyd v. Commissioner, 55 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1932) (deduction disallowed
for litigation expenses incurred to protect reputation).
48 See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943) (criminal); Lewis v.
Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. x958) (civil).
40See I.R.C. § 212; United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963); Hochschild
v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 8,7 (2d Cir. 1947).
'o I.R.C. § 7o.
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sist under an expenditure tax, in that the policy objective of
fostering the continued well-being of charities is likely to continue
to overshadow the ideal of income or consumption measurement. 1
Similarly, the deductibility of medical expenses 52 can be expected
to endure the shift to expenditure taxation, principally on the
strength of the argument that such expenses are not voluntary
consumption.5 3 By contrast, it is essential to deny deductions for
the consumption aspects of charitable contributions and medical
expenses, such as season tickets on the fifty-yard line received
by generous alumni 11 or the meals and lodging required on a
therapeutic trip to Acapulco. 3
5 The treatment of charitable contributions under an expenditure tax has
been a subject of disagreement. The Treasury argued that charitable contributions
are consumption of the donor and thus no deduction should be allowed for chari-
table giving, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 95-97, Ix6-I7, while Professors Andrews
and Bittker have contended that the charitable deduction is proper because it is
inappropriate to regard amounts given to charity as consumption by the donor,
Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REV. 309,
344-75 (I972); Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching
Grants?, 28 TAx L. REV. 37 (X972). The expenditure tax treatment of charitable
contributions of appreciated property is treated in greater detail below, see pp.
1631-33 infra.
2 I.R.C. § 213.
"3 Those who would repeal the medical deduction altogether argue that con-
sumers exercise a high degree of choice regarding most medical expenses and that
extraordinary medical expenses should be insured against, with such insurance
treated like any other normal consumption expenditure. Professor Andrews, on
the other hand, has argued that extraordinary medical expenses are not voluntary
consumption and that an income tax deduction is necessary to reflect properly
differences in individuals' abilities to pay tax. Andrews, supra note 5i, at 336. See
also Bittker, supra note 29, at x98-99. This argument has great force in an ex-
penditure tax context. An individual hospitalized for a long period of time simply
is not enjoying consumption in a manner equivalent to that of a healthy individual
who spends an identical amount of money on personal satisfaction, and an expendi-
ture tax base should reflect such differences.
41 See, e.g., Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) (deduc-
tion denied for contribution to education fund of church which supported schools
attended by taxpayers' children) ; cf. Estate of Wardwell v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d
632 (8th Cir. 1962) (deduction allowed for elderly person's gift to nursing home
into which she subsequently moved at donor's reduced rental rate); Rev. Rul.
67-246, 1967-2 C.B. X04 (membership fees in charitable organizations where
benefit received in return; deductible gift reduced by value of benefit received).
"'See, e.g., Ochs v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 692 '(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
827 (1952) (cost of maintaining children in boarding school to alleviate mother's
frail physical condition disallowed); Rabb v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH)
476 (1972) (costs of "milieu therapy," including specially tailored clothing,
new furniture, and remodeling of lake cottage disallowed); Jacobs v. Commis-
sioner, 62 T.C. 813 (i974) (deduction denied for psychiatrist-recommended di-
vorce expenses); Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (e) (iv) (meals and lodging while away from
home receiving medical treatment disallowed).
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If the current deductions for state and local taxes 5' are
premised on the argument that they are a necessary aspect of
fiscal federalism, such deductions will presumably be incor-
porated into an expenditure tax. Nevertheless, the proper treat-
ment of state and local taxes under an expenditure tax is
debatable. Professor Bittker argues that since state and local
tax payments are compulsory rather than voluntary, "it strains
reality to count state and local taxes as consumption expendi-
tures." 11 On the other hand, the Treasury Department in Blue-
prints argues that under either a comprehensive income tax or
an expenditure tax, no deduction should be allowed for state and
local sales taxes, but that state income taxes should be deduct-
ible.5" The rationale for this distinction is somewhat difficult to
follow., 9
In any event, individual taxpayers seem likely to regard both
state income and sales taxes as reducing the resources available
for private consumption. Perhaps there should be no state sales
tax deductions on the ground that they are merely a cost of con-
sumption, but if so, a portion of state income taxes should be
denied deduction on similar grounds. As the Haig-Simons defini-
tion teaches, taxes on income are in substantial part taxes on
consumption. An expenditure tax policy such as that suggested
by Blueprints, allowing a federal deduction for state income taxes
but not for sales taxes, would have the ironic result of encourag-
ing state and local governments to shift from taxes on consump-
tion to income taxes at the same time that the federal government
is shifting from an income tax to a consumption tax.
2. Imputed Income, Government Tranfers, and Statutory Ex-
clusions. - Economists favor the inclusion of imputed income or
consumption - the value of labor on one's own behalf or benefits
derived from property ownership - in taxable receipts under both
an income and expenditure tax.60 For the same reasons of political
" I.R.C. § 164.
6 Bittker, supra note 29, at 201.
58 BLUEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 92-94, 117.
" The Treasury apparently believes that income taxes "reduce the resources
available to the payor for consumption or accumulation," id. at 93, but that general
sales taxes do not reduce income reported by households and individuals and have
"already been 'deducted' from income sources," id., except to the extent that
sales tax rates vary among states and localities. However, this analysis seems to
assume that there is no important income effect with respect to sales taxes; that is,
that such taxes do not affect work-leisure choices. If people in fact work addi-
tional hours to earn enough income to pay sales taxes on goods they wish to con-
sume, this argument is erroneous.
60 See R. GooDE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOmE TAX 117-25 (1976) ; MEADE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 221-22; S. LoDIN, supra note 3, at 83-89; R. MUSORAVE & P. Mus-
GRAVE, PUBr.IC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 231-32 (,973).
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reality, administrabiity, and taxpayer comprehension which have
prevailed under the income tax, however, it is inconceivable that
imputed income from housework, farming, or other forms of
personal services would be included in receipts under an expend-
iture tax."' Under either system, little can be done to preclude
the substitution of nonmarket for market consumption.
A stronger case exists for expenditure taxation of government
transfer payments. Payments such as social security benefits and
veterans' pensions, now excluded from gross income, 2 may be
used to finance consumption in the same manner as wages and
should therefore be included in expenditure tax receipts. 3 Yet
where such transfers are based on a need test, the payments
should probably be excluded from an expenditure tax base. For
many in-kind transfers, valuation would be difficult. Moreover,
since the level of government transfers is presumably determined
on the assumption that they are tax free, taxation would simply
necessitate an increase in their level. As a practical matter, then,
expenditure tax receipts should include only transfers that are
not based on need and are either in cash or are easily valued if
in kind."
Other statutory income tax exclusions such as group term life
insurance, 5 employer-provided health insurance, 0 sick pay, 7
qualified group legal service plans,0 8 scholarships and fellow-
61 The largest amount of imputed income from services in the United States
results from domestic services rendered by homemakers to their own families. Re-
cent estimates have suggested that taxation of imputed income from this source
might increase the income tax base by as much as $2oo billion dollars. R.
MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 6o, at 232. Imputed income from the owner-
ship of property is discussed in Part IV infra.
62 Despite the absence of specific statutory authority, the long-standing policy
of the IRS has been to exclude from income payments received under welfare legis-
lation. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-280, 1970-I C.B. 13 (unemployment benefits); Rev.
Rul. 70-217, 1970-I C.B. 12 (social security payments); Rev. Rul. 72-6o5, 1972-
2 C.B. 35 (veterans' benefits).
63 Otherwise, advantages would result to recipients depending upon their mar-
ginal tax brackets, with higher bracket taxpayers obtaining relatively greater ad-
vantages from the exclusion. Where individuals contribute to such plans, however,
deductions should be allowed.
64 Likewise, transfers from charities should be excluded from receipts, if for
no other reason than the administrative difficulty of taxing them, for example, food
from the Salvation Army or health care from the Red Cross. In addition, con-
sumption benefits that individuals receive from general government services, such
as recreational facilities, would necessarily be excluded from the expenditure tax
base.
6 5 I.R.C. § 79.
6 I.R.C. § io6.
67 I.R.C. § io4(a).
11 I.R.C. § 120.
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ships,"D and prizes and awards," while theoretically includible in
a comprehensive income tax base, reflect clear congressional policy
choices in favor of certain kinds of receipts. Even though
such exclusions would be difficult to justify theoretically, there is
no reason to suspect that their proponents (for example, labor
unions in the case of group legal services) would be less effective
in persuading Congress to enact such provisions under an ex-
penditure tax.7 1
D. Administrative Considerations
In general, an expenditure tax does not seem likely to produce
administrative problems significantly greater than or different
from those familiar under an income tax. An expenditure tax,
like the income tax, would depend to a large extent upon self-
assessment and voluntary compliance. Collection procedures,
dispute resolution procedures, enforcement, and sanctions under
an expenditure tax likely would be similar to those under the cur-
rent income tax. Withholding and information reporting, however,
would likely present certain additional problems under an ex-
penditure tax.
Since more than seventy-five percent of total individual in-
come tax liability is collected through withholding,72 the need
for current tax payment through a withholding system should be
apparent. Collection of the bulk of taxes at the source through
withholding would be essential to an expenditure tax. However,
producing accurate withholding under an expenditure tax will
probably prove more difficult than under the current income tax.
Under an income tax, wage withholding depends only on the
amount of the taxpayer's wages; credits and deductions are
typically estimated on the basis of the taxpayer's wages.73 Under
" I.R.C. § 117.
'
0 Id. § 74.
1 The income tax contains a provision, known generally as the standard deduc-
tion (now the "zero bracket amount"), which taxpayers may take in lieu of item-
ized deductions. Id. § 63(d). The amount of the standard deduction has been
adjusted from time to time to ensure its use by a substantial majority of taxpayers
and therefore to eliminate many taxpayers' need to keep records of expenses
which qualify for itemized deductions. If itemized deductions were allowable
under an expenditure tax, as seems likely, the objective of minimizing record-
keeping could be achieved by a comparable standard deduction. Pressures to enact
tax credits in lieu of itemized deductions and to allow deductions (for example,
the charitable deduction) in addition to the standard deduction should be resisted
under an expenditure tax, however.
72 COMM 3sIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1978) (cal-
culated from table of Gross Internal Revenue Collections by source).
' See I.R.C. § 3402. More individualized withholding is allowed, however, in
certain cases. See id. § 3402 (m) (special withholding option based on excess itemized
deductions).
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an expenditure tax, the amount of final tax liability would also
depend on the taxpayer's annual savings or investment. The
best withholding approximation would estimate consumption on
the basis of wages and typical allocations of consumption and
savings." Achieving aggregate wage withholding under an ex-
penditure tax generally within the current range of income tax
accuracy seems feasible, but greater variations in withholding
error among individuals with similar wages and different savings
patterns, and for the same individual from year to year, seem
likely.75 The greatest variations are likely to be concentrated
in the upper brackets. Withholding on expenditure tax receipts
other than wages does not seem practical. 71
Increased information reporting may also be necessary under
an expenditure tax. For example, if, as is argued below, loans
must be reported on a cash-flow basis," lenders should be re-
quired to provide annual information statements to taxpayers
informing them of both amounts borrowed and repaid. Likewise,
if gifts and bequests were includible in receipts of donees,78
information reporting should probably be required for gifts and
bequests. Similarly, if individuals would be required to report
receipts from businesses on a cash-flow basis, reporting of such
payments should be required.
Likewise, expenditure tax information returns might be re-
quired for purchases and sales of investment assets and for net
annual additions or reductions in savings account balances with
financial institutions. Since the entire sales price of investment
assets would be includible in expenditure tax receipts, incentives
for underreporting sales would be greater than under the income
tax, where only gain is includible in the tax base. For the typical
stock market transaction, however, it would be difficult to re-
quire sellers to report social security numbers of purchasers.
Absent effective enforcement, deductions for purchases of in-
vestment assets might be overstated and receipts from sales of
such assets understated, therefore some aid to enforcement ap-
pears essential. 9
" There would likely be a tendency to err on the side of overwithholding to
assure collection of the tax, and interest should be paid on amounts overwithheld.
IC See p. 1583 supra (withholding error).
70 Withholding on dividends and interest has been suggested from time to time
under the income tax but has not been enacted principally because of difficulties
in relating such withholding to taxpayers' marginal tax rates. In addition to these
administrative problems, under an expenditure tax no tax would be due if these
investment returns were reinvested.
" See pp. i6og-io infra (cash flow treatment of loans).
7 See pp. 1624-26 infra (gifts and bequests taxed to donees).
" Kaldor and Slitor, for example, urge the use of an expenditure tax voucher
system, ,under which purchasers would be required to furnish vouchers to sellers,
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Excessive reliance on information reporting as an enforce-
ment device should be avoided, however. The Internal Revenue
Service's ability to cross-check information reports under the
present income tax system is quite inadequate, 0 and expansion
of this capability would be desirable. As under the current in-
come tax, expenditure tax enforcement would be largely depen-
dent upon taxpayers' voluntary compliance. 8' If the so-called audit
lottery were played aggressively, with tax returns serving prin-
cipally as opening bids, serious enforcement problems would
occur. The expenditure tax avoidance game would emphasize
efforts to disguise or exclude consumption from the tax base, as
contrasted with the income tax where tax avoidance efforts are
often concentrated on excluding investment income from tax or
deferring tax on such income through tax shelter schemes.
IV. TIMING ISSUES: THE TREATMENT OF INVESTMENTS,
CONSUMER DURABLES, AND HOUSING
Issues of timing in income taxation, particularly with respect
to when deductions are permitted and when amounts must be
which presumably would be forwarded to the IRS to confirm transactions. N.
KALDOR, supra note I, at 2,7; Slitor, supra note x8, at 254-55.
S" In 1978, for example, the Internal Revenue Service collected about 484
million wage, interest, and dividend information returns, but just over half were
submitted on magnetic type for possible computer matching. CoMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, supra note 72, at 14. When information returns are sub-
mitted on individual papers, the process of transferring such information onto
magnetic tape is alone a sufficient burden to preclude cross-checking. If the num-
ber of information returns were to increase significantly because of the expan-
sion of the category of receipts under an expenditure tax, it might be necessary to
require that information be submitted in a form which is readily usable by the IRS,
for example, on magnetic tape. Such a requirement would be burdensome to some
taxpayers.
"1 Audit selection under an expenditure tax would tend to mirror the current
income tax process. A mathematical technique would likely be used similar to
the so-called "discriminant index function" which now identifies returns with a high
potential for significant understatement of income tax. See COMMIssIoNER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, supra note 72, at 24. Assuming that the cash-flow method of
reporting investment assets recommended in Part IV were adopted, the construction
of a similar expenditure tax formula would be facilitated if taxpayers were re-
quired to report beginning and ending cash balances. Otherwise, variations among
individuals in the amount of cash on hand might produce variations in consumption
which would not be explained by information contained in the return.
If businesses were required to shift to a cash method of accounting for the ex-
penditure tax while continuing to use an accrual method of accounting for financial
reporting, the divergence between book and tax accounting would render auditing
more difficult, increase enforcement costs, and perhaps require additional training
of revenue agents. If an expenditure tax were adopted as a supplement to the
the income tax, expenditure tax accounting and income tax accounting would have
to be closely coordinated.
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included in income, have received detailed consideration by tax
analysts. In the expenditure tax context, analysis of timing issues
is critical both for an understanding of how an expenditure tax
differs from other taxes, particularly income or wage taxes, and
also for guidance in resolving implementation questions. Pro-
ponents of an expenditure tax, such as Professor Andrews and
the Treasury Department in Blueprints, have argued that the
capacity of an expenditure tax to handle timing problems equitably
and without economic distortion is one of its significant advan-
tages over an income tax."
A. Tax Deferral in General: The Treatment
of Financial Assets and Loans
i. The Immediate-Deduction/Yield-Exemption Equival-
ence. - Income tax deferral is most commonly described by ref-
erence to taxpayers who reduce their income by a certain amount
initially, usually by accelerating deductions or postponing income,
and in a later taxable year report an income increased by that same
amount. The effect of such tax deferral is most often demon-
strated by two alleged equivalences: (i) the equivalence of tax
deferral to an interest-free loan from the government to the tax-
payer,83 and (2) the equivalence of allowing an immediate deduc-
tion for the cost of an investment to imposing tax initially and
exempting from tax the income from the investment. If valid,
this latter equivalence (the "Immediate-Deduction/Yield-Exemp"
tion Equivalence" 84) would be important under a consumption
tax for two reasons. First, it would allow creation of simple and
flexible rules for implementing a consumption tax. Second, since
a consumption tax, unlike an income tax, is not intended to be
imposed on the yield from savings per se, this equivalence seems
to suggest that a consumption tax is equivalent to a wage tax.8 5
On the other hand, it is consistent with the widely expressed
notion that the difference between an income tax and an expend-
iture tax is solely a matter of timing.86
Professor Andrews' example relating to deferred compensa-
tion is a helpful introduction to the basic timing difference be-
82 See BLUENrs, supra note 3, at 9, 127-28; Andrews, supra note 3, at n113,
1120-28, 1150. See also Klein, Timing in Personal Taxation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 461
(1977).
11 See E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAETz, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION 335-38 (976).
84 See E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in
INCOME, ENPLOYM ENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSON
(948); C. SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 302 (i969). See also S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO
TAX RErORM 123 (I973).
85 See Warren, supra note 5, at 931.
" See Andrews, supra note 3, at 1120.
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tween income and expenditure taxes.8 7 Assuming an income tax
of 33-i/3%, one dollar of wages will produce 67 cents to invest.
If return on investment were 9% before tax, such a tax would
reduce the return to 6%. Thus, if no tax deferral were permitted,
one dollar of before-tax earnings put aside for 24 years would
produce only $2.67 for retirement. In the absence of tax (be-
cause the dollar is removed from the tax base by current de-
duction), the one dollar invested for 24 years until retirement
will produce eight dollars for consumption. A 33% tax imposed
at that time would reduce that amount to $5.33. Deferring the
tax 24 years has doubled the after-tax return. This example
illustrates that tax deferral, even when an identical tax rate is
subsequently imposed, is clearly inconsistent with the concep-
tually correct income tax treatment, which is to tax interest
earnings as they occur. In contrast, such deferral is consistent
with the concept of an expenditure tax; taxes on amounts in-
vested and their return should be deferred until the proceeds are
used for consumption. The deferral illustrated in this example
is also consistent with the economic definition of an expenditure
tax offered by the Meade Commission:
[T]he characteristic feature of an expenditure tax as contrasted
with an income tax [is] that, at any given constant rate of tax,
the former will make the rate of return to the saver on his re-
duced consumption equal to the rate of return which can be
earned on the investment which his savings finances, whereas
the income tax will reduce the rate of return to the saver below
the rate of return which the investment will yield.88
As Professor Andrews notes, 9 the Immediate-Deduction/Yield-
Exemption Equivalence holds in the above example; the same
result would be reached by taxing 33 cents from the original
dollar of earnings and allowing the remaining 67 cents to grow
to $5.33 without additional tax.
2. The Treasury's Proposal.- The Treasury Department in
Blueprints relies upon the Immediate-Deduction/Yield-Exemp-
tion Equivalence not only to distinguish income from expenditure
taxes, but also to develop its specific expenditure tax rules. 90 The
Treasury recommends that an expenditure tax should allow tax-
payers to elect either (i) Immediate-Deduction (cash-flow) treat-
ment, under which purchases of financial assets would be deducted
and subsequent withdrawals of principal and earnings taxed, or
87 Id. at 1125.
aMF-DE REPoRT, supra note 3, at 37.
8 See Andrews, supra note 3, at 1126.
0 See BLuEPRwTs, supra note 3, at 119-27.
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(2) Yield-Exemption treatment under which no deduction would
be allowed for purchases of financial assets but earnings and with-
drawals of principal would be exempt from tax. Borrowers would
be afforded a similar choice between (i) including the amount
of a loan in receipts and taking subsequent deductions for pay-
ments of interest and repayments of principal and (2) excluding
loan proceeds from receipts, but foregoing later deductions. The
Treasury justifies such taxpayer discretion on the ground that
"[t]he consequences . . . of the two ways of taxing the purchase
of assets would . . . be the same in present value terms." 91
Assume, for example, that in year i the taxpayer borrows $ioo
at io% interest; in year 2, the loan plus interest -$io - is
repaid. Taxpayers and the government should generally be in-
different whether the $ioo loan is included in receipts in year i
and $iio is deducted in year 2 or whether the entire transaction
is omitted from expenditure tax accounts. This is because the
interest deduction foregone under the omission alternative would
increase tax liability in year 2 by an amount equal to interest
on the amount of tax deferred by not including the loan in receipts
in year i.
(a) Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Approach to Tax Parity. -Even
assuming the Immediate-Deduction/Yield-Exemption Equival-
ence were valid, the Treasury's proposal is problematic because it
apparently reflects an ex ante approach to tax parity. The Treas-
ury proposal treats persons similarly whenever their tax base
(consumption in this case) is the same in present value terms.
Under the Yield-Exemption option, "lucky investors might be-
come very rich and owe no additional [expenditure] tax liability on
future consumption of their wealth [and] unlucky investors will
have prepaid a tax on expected returns and will then obtain no
deduction for the losses they incur." 92 Whenever persons are in
equivalent circumstances ex ante, the Treasury would apparently
ignore differences in circumstances ex post."3
But an ex ante approach to taxation requires a major restruc-
turing of the classic conceptions of tax equity. Horizontal equity,
the most widely accepted notion of fairness in taxation, requires
that persons in similar circumstances pay similar amounts of
91 See id. at 123.
92 1d. at 129.
11 The analogous ex ante definition of income is "the amount which [an in-
dividual] could consume in any one year and yet be left with the resources and
expectations at the end of that year which would enable him to maintain that
same level of consumption indefinitely in the future." MEADE REPORT, supra note
3, at 31. The Meade Commission seems to reject an ex ante approach to tax im-
plementation for reasons of practicality, but accepts it as a basis for assessing vari-
ous taxing schemes.
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tax. Although the tax literature is replete with disputes over
whether "similar" or "different" circumstances are being com-
pared,9" the notion that similar circumstances should be evaluated
ex ante in present value terms seems quite a radical departure.
Regardless of the precise contours of the definition of income or
consumption, it seems clear that horizontal equity must be an
ex post concept. Circumstances should be considered as similar
only after results are known; lucky gamblers are not the same as
unlucky gamblers.95
An ex ante approach is even more troubling with reference to
the vertical equity criterion. Vertical equity is said to require
differential taxation of persons in different circumstances, and is
principally used with reference to the fairness of the distribution
of the tax burden among persons with different amounts of in-
come, consumption, or wealth. Certainly, if one accepts a vertical
equity criterion which relates the distribution of the tax burden
to "ability to pay," ex post rather than ex ante circumstances
would be relevant. If progressive taxation is to be justified,
even in part, as a device for the redistribution of income, con-
sumption, or wealth, the tax base must distinguish those who are
lucky from those who are unlucky, even though they might have
been in the same position with respect to their expectations be-
fore the gamble. Thus, although the appropriate time period
for applying a progressive rate structure and the question whether
consumption is a proper base for progressive taxation may be
controversial, once an expenditure tax with progressive rates is
chosen the tax must be imposed with regard to actual, not ex-
pected, consumption."
(b) Ex Post Relationship of Immediate-Deduction and Yield-
Exemption.- Although Blueprints appears to follow an ex ante
approach, the Treasury may not actually have intended to en-
dorse such a perspective. Its recommendations are based upon
the Immediate-Deduction/Yield-Exemption Equivalence, which
would hold ex post as well as ex ante under a restrictive set of
conditions which are present in all of the Treasury's examples and
which are typically assumed (although often not explicitly) in
the economic and legal literature.97
o See, e.g., Warren, supra note 5, at 931.
o See generally N. KALDOR, supra note i, at 6o-64.
9 Professor Warren suggests that an ex ante view is implicit in the choice of
a consumption tax rather than an income tax, but Professor Andrews and this
Article argue that a properly designed consumption tax may be imposed on an
ex post basis. Compare Warren, supra note 5, at 931 and Warren, supra note 6,
with Andrews, supra note 4, at 947.
97 See, e.g., Bi.xuam-anrs, supra note 3, at 123; Andrews, supra note 3, at 1124-
25; Andrews, supra note 4, at 947.
1979] CONSUMPTION TAX 16oi
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Even if the Treasury's proposal is ultimately consistent with
an ex post approach, however, the practical ex post validity of
the Immediate-Deduction/Yield-Exemption Equivalence remains
to be determined. If the equivalence holds, an expenditure tax
should be equivalent to a tax on wages, under which all income
from savings would be excluded from the tax base. It would then
be a matter of indifference whether the base for an expenditure tax
is computed by deducting amounts saved or exempting investment
sales and yield. The major difficulty with the Treasury's pro-
posal is that the ex post equivalence of Immediate-Deduction and
Yield-Exemption depends upon the following set of unrealistic
conditions:
(i) Tax rates are not progressive; moreover, they do not
change over time.
(2) Taxpayers have no accumulated wealth when the system
is first introduced.
(3) The system is closed; either the taxpayer exhausts his
wealth by death, the system classifies all remaining capital
balances (all bequests) as being consumption in the taxpayer's
final return, or an identical tax is subsequently imposed on
bequests in some other manner.
(4) There exists a perfect capital market with no uncertainty;
all taxpayers can borrow and lend unlimited amounts at a
risk-free interest rate.
(5) All income can be classified as one of two types: wage
income or income to capital accumulated during and after the
initial period.
These conditions simply will not exist when an expenditure
tax is actually implemented. As noted at the outset, any decision
to shift to an expenditure tax must be premised on the retention
of a progressive rate structure. Yet progressivity alone destroys
the equivalence. Furthermore, tax rates are likely to vary over
time, capital markets are imperfect, return on investments is un-
certain, and the system is open at the beginning. The Immediate-
Deduction/Yield-Exemption Equivalence therefore will not hold
ex post in practice and should not serve as the basic guide to
implementation decisions.
Perhaps most importantly, with uncertainty and progressive
rates, the distributional consequences of the two methods would
be quite different. With a progressive rate structure, the cash-
flow version of the tax would narrow the after-tax differences
between the lucky and unlucky investor in ways that the ommis-
sion alternative would not. An expenditure tax under either the
Immediate-Deduction or Yield-Exemption option would not re-
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duce the before-tax rate of return on investment capital, but
this does not make the options equivalent.
Under the cash-flow method, the government can be regarded
as automatically becoming a joint venturer in taxpayers' invest-
ments. It, in effect, invests a percentage equal to the taxpayer's
marginal tax rate in each venture- for example, with a 6o%
marginal rate, the taxpayer's initial tax saving is 6o % of the cash
investment and the government receives 6o% of the gain or con-
tributes 6o% of the loss. Thus, a taxpayer would be better off
under the Yield-Exemption option where the rate of return ex-
ceeds his cost of borrowing.
Consider, for example, two 6o% taxpayers, A and B, each
with funds available for consumption of $40, who desire to pur-
chase an investment for $ioo. A, choosing Immediate-Deduction,
will receive tax savings of $6o from the $ioo deduction. On sale
for $iio, tax of $66 will be due, leaving him with $44, a ioo
return. B chooses Yield-Exemption and borrows $6o, as he re-
ceives no financing from a tax deduction. Assuming a cost of
borrowing of io%, B keeps $44 after receiving $iio and paying
the debt of $66. But if B can borrow at 5%, he can keep $47,
thereby obtaining a greater return than A.
The two methods of treatment produce equivalent results
under certain assumptions. One such assumption is that invest-
ments of different magnitudes have the same yield. Thus, equiv-
alence is established if A and B invest in assets costing $ioo and
$40, respectively, which each yield io%. With borrowing in the
picture, equivalence can only be established by assuming that the
ratio of borrowing to investment is always the same. Thus if B
finances an investment of $ioo by borrowing $60 as above, A
could invest his funds of $4o by purchasing an investment of
$250. Tax savings would be $6o and borrowing $i 5o. B would,
as above, receive $44 or $47 depending on his cost of borrowing.
A would receive the same; thus, at a 5% interest cost, A would
receive $275, repay $157.50, for a net of $117.50 or $47 after
tax. To the extent that speculative investment opportunities (or
borrowing opportunities) are limited, the two methods would not
be equivalent, and the cash-flow method would lessen the differ-
ences among winning and losing taxpayers. Likewise, if aggre-
gate gains exceed aggregate losses (or if losses are not eligible
for immediate refunds), government revenues would be greater
under the cash-flow method, even with a constant flat rate tax.
Equivalence would also fail if, under the omission alternative
for loans, a taxpayer did not subsequently pay interest or repay
the loan proceeds. If such a transaction were omitted from ex-
penditure tax accounts, taxpayers could enjoy additional con-
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sumption free of tax. Although this problem is not addressed by
the Treasury in Blueprints, if loans were not initially included
in receipts, forgiveness of indebtedness or default on principal or
interest should result in an expenditure tax receipt in the amount
of the principal and accrued interest."
Opportunities for manipulation to save tax would remain
available, however, whenever tax accounting rules permitted de-
parture from the assumptions underlying the Immediate-Deduc-
tion/Yield-Exemption Equivalence. The ability to shift assets
within a single accounting period is illustrative. Assume that on
January i a taxpayer receives $i,ooo which he invests in an
asset under the Yield-Exemption alternative. If the asset is worth
$i,ioo on December 31, the taxpayer might sell it and reinvest
the proceeds under the Immediate-Deduction alternative, thereby
obtaining a net deduction of $ioo (the $iioo investment less the
$i,ooo of receipts) under circumstances where wealth has in-
creased by $ioo. The process could be repeated by immediately
selling the asset on January i of the next year and reinvesting
the proceeds until December 31 in a Yield-Exemption asset.
Over time, the problem would be similar to year-end deferral,
related to techniques familar under the income tax for accelerat-
ing deductions and postponing income.
Similar results could be achieved by borrowing in January on
a cash-flow basis and investing the proceeds in a Yield-Exemption
asset until the loan was repaid on December 31. Assuming io%
interest on the loan and a io% investment return, the taxpayer
could obtain a net deduction of the interest payment in a transac-
tion which produced no change in net wealth. The January i
loan receipt of $i,ooo would be included in receipts, the Decem-
ber 3 $i,ioo repayment deducted, and the $ioo earnings ex-
cluded by a Yield-Exemption election. As the examples illustrate,
an expenditure tax would be systematically biased in favor of tax
deferral whenever the amount deferred plus an appropriate
amount of interest would not subsequently appear in the tax
base. 9
Additional problems occur when the Treasury's assumption
that there is no basis ex ante for a taxpayer to prefer one of the
9 This treatment would be somewhat similar to the current income tax treat-
ment of borrowing which excludes loans from income and includes discharges of
indebtedness in income. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. I
(193i).
" This problem seems likely to be solved, if at all, only through a general pro-
vision similar to that now contained in I.R.C. § 446 which would give the Com-
missioner authority to challenge tax returns where amounts reported do not
"clearly reflect" expenditures. However, such a provision would be inconsistent
with taxpayers' ability to elect Yield-Exemption treatment and seems unworkable.
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two options is erroneous in fact. To the extent that tax rates are
progressive or are expected to vary over time, taxpayers' ex ante
calculations may be affected. As noted earlier, the Yield-Exemp-
tion alternative would be selected whenever the immediate deduc-
tion foregone would be expected to reduce tax at a lower rate
than would apply to a subsequent gain. Under an elective system,
taxpayers could likewise be expected to seek information about
results before making an irrevocable election, especially for
assets purchased early in the taxable year. Delays in making
elections as well as efforts to revoke disadvantageous elections
should also be expected. Administration of the tax laws would
be simplified and tax manipulation opportunities restricted under
a mandatory rather than elective system.
Moreover, even strict rules concerning the timing and irrevo-
cability of elections would not preclude taxpayers from structuring
transactions to maximize advantages from the optional forms of
treatment. Common estate planning techniques would have im-
mediate application in an expenditure tax context.100 In estate
planning, the goal is to "freeze the size of a client's estate at its
current level and direct future growth to the natural objects of
the client's bounty." 101 In expenditure tax planning, the goal
would be to obtain deductions for investment on an Immediate-
Deduction basis and direct future appreciation to taxpayers sub-
ject to Yield-Exemption treatment. One common estate planning
technique is to freeze value in closely held corporations with
substantial appreciation potential. 0 2 Under an expenditure tax,
a parent might transfer $2,000,00o to a corporation and elect
cash-flow treatment, thereby obtaining an immediate deduction
for the amount transferred. In return, the parent would receive
preferred stock paying dividends of ten percent. His adult child
transfers $200,000 to the corporation for all of the common stock,
and elects Yield-Exemption treatment. If the value of the corpora-
tion appreciates, say by $2,000,000, in the next two years, the
parent would receive a total of $400,000 ($2oo,ooo each year)
which would be includible in his expenditure tax receipts (and
taxed, if consumed); the child could sell his stock for $i,8oo,ooo
and realize a $i,6oo,ooo gain free of expenditure tax. Preventing
avoidance through this type of transaction would require ex-
tensive and well-designed rules, and given the lack of estate tax
success at inhibiting such transactions, optimism hardly seems
warranted.13
"'°See generally G. CooPER, A VOLuNTARY TAX: Naw PERSPECTIVES ON
SOPHISTICATED ESTATE TAX AvoiDANcE 12-20 (1978).
'
0 1 Id. at 12.
'02 See id. at 13-20.
'o'By the same token, expenditure tax planning techniques can be expected to
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The Treasury proposal permits even more obvious tax avoid-
ance possibilities by allowing inconsistent treatment of loans and
assets. By electing Yield-Exemption treatment for loans and
Immediate-Deduction treatment for assets, expenditure tax shel-
ter opportunities even more advantageous than those available
under the income tax would become available. This may be illus-
trated by considering the expenditure tax consequences of a typical
motion picture tax shelter. 04
Assume that a taxpayer purchases the United States rights to
a foreign movie for $2,ooo,ooo. The taxpayer's cash investment
is $200,000 and the remaining $i,8oo,ooo is borrowed from the
foreign producer. The loan is payable first out of the proceeds
of the film with the balance, if any, due and payable in 20 years.
The film is unsuccessful and realizes only $1,500,000 of income,
$1,200,000 in the first year and $300,000 in the second year. In
year 20, the taxpayer defaults on the remaining indebtedness of
$300,000. 05
Under a cash-flow expenditure tax, the $2,000,000 purchase
of the film and the income ($1,200,000 in year i and $3oo,ooo in
year 2) would be taken into account on a cash-flow basis with
the $i,8oo,ooo borrowing and the $1,2oo,ooo repayment taken
shift risks of loss to taxpayers who elect cash-flow treatment, while providing
appreciation for taxpayers who elect Yield-Exemption treatment. For example,
a parent and his children invest $2ooooo each in an oil field, arranging their
ownership like squares on a checkerboard with the parent taking the black squares,
the child the red. The parent elects Immediate-Deduction treatment and the
child elects the Yield-Exemption option. The parent spends $x,Soo,ooo on drilling
to locate the oil within the field, deducts this amount, and discovers oil worth a
total of $3,000,0oo. The parent and child then sell their interests for $3,ooo,ooo
($1,5oo,ooo each). The parent would be required to include his proceeds in
receipts, but would have obtained a net expenditure tax deduction of $200,000.
The child would have obtained $i,3oo,ooo free of expenditure tax.
For other estate planning techniques with potential expenditure tax applica-
tion, see Miller, Certain Aspects of Estate Planning for the Business Owner, 33
N.Y.U. INsT. FEn. TAx. 8i, 98-99 (1975).
104 The example in the text was used by the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation in its June 1S, 1974, presentation to the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee.
105 Under the income tax, results would depend on allowable depreciation. As-
suming an estimate of $I,5ooooo of total income was made in the first few weeks
following release, under the income forecast method the taxpayer would be allowed
depreciation deductions of $i,6ooooo the first year (8o% of $2,ooo,ooo since the
first year's income is So% of forecast income) and $4ooooo in the second year.
See Rev. Rul. 60-358, i96o-2 C.B. 68, amplified by Rev. Rul. 64-273, 1964-2 C.B.
62. The tax loss for year i is $400,oo0 ($i,2OOO00 of income and $x,6ooooo of
depreciation deductions) and the tax loss in the second year is $ioo,ooo ($30oooo0
of income and $4oo,ooo of depreciation deductions). In year 20, $300,000 of income
results from the default on indebtedness. The present value of the tax discounted
at 6% would be $395,186.
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into account in year i and the $300,000 repayment taken into
account in year 2. No cash transaction occurs in year 20 so noth-
ing would be reported. Under an election to treat the asset on
an Immediate-Deduction basis but to omit borrowing, the loan
transaction would not enter into the expenditure tax computation
until year 20, when the default on indebtedness should produce a
$3oo,00o receipt. The results would be as follows:
Year i:
Receipts:
Income from film:
Loan
Total Receipts:
Deductions:
Purchase of film:
Repayment of loan:
Total Deductions
Taxable Expenditure
(or loss)
Year 2:
Receipts:
Income from film
Deductions:
Repayment of loan
Taxable Expenditure
Year 2o:
Receipts:
Default on loan:
Taxable Expenditure
Present value of
tax loss: 101
Cash-Flow
Expenditure
Tax
$1,200,000
1)800,000
$3,000,000
$2,000,000
1,200,000
$3,200,000
($ 200,000)
$ 300,000
300,000
$ -0-
-0-
-0-
(200,000)
Borrowing Omitted
Expenditure
Tax
$1,200,000
-0-
$1,200,000
$2,000,000
-0--
$2,000,000
($ 800,000)
$ 300,000
-0-
$ 300,000
$ 300,000
$ 300,000
(417,827)
Since no amount is repaid in year 20 because of the taxpayer's
default on the indebtedness, that year's transaction is not in-
cluded in the expenditure tax base under the cash-flow computa-
tion; under the loan omission alternative, on the other hand, a
'1 Discounted to the end of year x at a rate of 6%. The tax savings can be
obtained by multiplying these figures by the taxpayer's marginal rate.
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receipt of $300,000 should be required. If the loan were in fact
repaid, a loss of $300,000 would occur in year 20 under the cash-
flow method and no amount would enter under the loan omission
computation. In either case, the losses under both alternatives
would be the same: $200,000, if the loan were not repaid, and
$500,000, if it were, although their timing, and therefore their
present values, would be quite different.
The loan omission alternative provides an after-tax return
even greater in present value than that available under the income
tax prior to recent reforms, 107 and if the default were not re-
quired to be reported as a receipt in year 20, as seems possible
under Blueprints, tax losses would total $5oo,ooo even though
the taxpayer is out of pocket only $200,000.
The disallowance of interest deductions under the loan omis-
sion alternative, however, would tend to compensate for the de-
ferral which would be possible under such a scheme, and the
example may overstate the problem because no stated interest is
paid. 08 If an appropriate interest rate were charged, no deduc-
tions were allowed for interest, and any interest or principal
forgiven or defaulted were required to be included in receipts, the
tax shelter possibilities under the loan omission alternative would
generally be substantially less than under the present income tax,
but at the same time the ability to deduct immediately the full
107 In this case the taxpayer has, in effect, shifted $3o0,ooo of the loss to the
foreign producer by the borrowing and subsequent default, thereby losing only
$2oo,ooo. Both the income and the expenditure tax result in total tax losses equal
to the $2oo,ooo economic loss, and at a 6o% tax rate produce a total tax
savings of $12o,ooo. The timing of the tax savings varies dramatically, however,
as would the present value effect. Under the cash-flow expenditure tax, the entire
$2o,ooo tax savings occurs in year x.
The present value of the tax savings (discounted at 6%) under the income tax
as of the end of year i equals $237,112. One might have expected a 6o%
income tax to reduce the before-tax loss by only 6o% but instead, by bor-
rowing and deferring default, the taxpayer has turned a before-tax loss into an
after-tax gain. (Since interest would be deductible under the income tax, the
omission of interest payments from the example makes no difference to this con-
clusion.) That such income tax results occur is well known to high-bracket tax-
payers and their advisors. The Tax Reform Acts of x969 and 1976 and the Rev-
enue Act of 1978 have restricted many tax shelter techniques, see, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 465. See generally Graetz, The Evolution of the Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976: Fewer than Fifty Ways to Limit Your Losses, 29 S. CAL. TAx
INST. 1 (1977), but certain opportunities remain. Results may diverge even further
from the norm in cases in which the taxpayer's income tax bracket changes
over time or where the ultimate income on default or "phantom gain" is taxed at
capital gains rates. Moreover, in many cases the phantom gain is never reported
by taxpayers or discovered on audit.
'
0
' Indeed, if the interest on the loan is equal to the discount rate, the present
value of the tax saving is the same under either scheme. A higher interest rate
on the loan would make the borrowing omission option less attractive.
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purchase price of an asset, including borrowed amounts, would
create additional difficulties.
As the previous example illustrates, however, difficulties with
the loan omission alternative would occur when the loan proceeds
or interest are not repaid, either because the loan was from a
related person and forgiven, or because the taxpayer defaulted.
Collection of tax when indebtedness is discharged would be
difficult. Underreporting of gain from such discharge is hard to
detect, and even if the gain is reported or detected on audit,
collection of the tax may frequently be difficult because of the
absence of cash receipts in the year the tax is due.
As the foregoing example also demonstrates, the expend-
iture tax treatment of borrowing must be coordinated with the
treatment of related assets. Treating loans on a cash-flow basis
would eliminate the potential for deferral regardless of how
assets were treated. Likewise, if assets were treated under
the Yield-Exemption alternative, omitting related borrowing from
expenditure tax accounts would not add any new problems, al-
though the ability to leverage investments on a Yield-Exemption
basis in combination with progressive rates might increase the
ex post advantages to lucky winners and disadvantages to unlucky
losers. If, however, assets could be treated on a cash-flow basis
and loans could be omitted from expenditure tax accounting, tax
shelter opportunities would continue to be available under an
expenditure tax.10 9
3. Recommendation. -On balance, it is important that an
expenditure tax be computed by treating assets and loans on
a cash-flow basis, except in cases in which different treatment is
necessary because of administrative considerations. A cash-flow
approach should tend to produce less variance among ultimate
winners and losers than would exemption of yield. And if in-
dividuals systematically underestimate probabilities of success
100 If enactment of cash-flow reporting of assets and loans were impossible
for political reasons, the best alternative would be to limit expenditure tax deduc-
tions for investments, including asset purchases, to the taxpayer's equity in the
investment (in other words, to reverse the rule of Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S.
i (1947)). This would be equivalent to including borrowed amounts in receipts
and allowing a deduction for the full cost of assets, but such an approach would
encounter serious difficulties. It would be necessary, for example, to accompany
such a rule with a provision that would "recapture" deductions whenever assets
are refinanced. Likewise, difficulties would occur because of the need to amortize
loans in order to allow deductions whenever additional principal amounts are con-
tributed. However, if interest deductions were allowed with respect to such loans
-as they should be if deductions for assets purchased were limited to equity-it
would not be necessary to distinguish payments of interest and principal. It
might nevertheless be necessary to trace indebtedness to various assets since in
other instances interest deductions might be disallowed.
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(perhaps because they are risk-averse), an immediate deduction
might stimulate investment more than would an exemption of
yield. A Yield-Exemption option would be confusing to taxpayers,
would increase tax planning opportunities, and would tend to
undermine a progressive marginal rate structure designed to
distinguish among taxpayers on the basis of their actual consump-
tion.
Cash-flow treatment of investment assets and loans would
eliminate certain income tax complexities, principally those de-
signed to mitigate the distinction between realized (and therefore
taxable) gains and losses and unrealized (and therefore nontax-
able) gains and losses. These would include the capital gains-
ordinary income distinction,"10 the nonrecognition provisions,"
and installment sale provisions.'12 Likewise, full cash-flow re-
porting would eliminate the need for depreciation and recapture
provisions 113 since all purchases of investment assets would be
immediately deducted and all sales proceeds included in full in
receipts. Finally, any need for inflation adjustments, as have
been suggested for capital gains and depreciation under the in-
come tax, would be unnecessary under an expenditure tax.
There may be some instances, however, where the Yield-
Exemption alternative would substantially simplify tax adminis-
tration under circumstances in which tax planning opportunities
would not be widely available. Under an income tax, individuals
generally assume that deferring tax will be advantageous to them;
under an expenditure tax, individuals may be indifferent to tax
postponement and, in some cases, because of the progressive rate
structure, may actually prefer to prepay expenditure taxes as an
averaging technique. As a result, the techniques of tax deferral
familar under an income tax would not tend to cause similar
systematic distortions under an expenditure tax. Obtaining a
deduction in an earlier year would be of no value to taxpayers
under a constant rate expenditure tax in which an annual return
equivalent to the discount rate plus the amount of the original
deduction would be included in the tax base in a later year.
In cases in which progressivity and changing rates are not
likely to be systematically distorting factors, in which returns are
generally predictable and imperfections in the capital markets
may be reasonably ignored, and in which administrative con-
siderations argue for the Yield-Exemption alternative, this method
of accounting for asset purchases might be used in lieu of cash-
11
° See I.R.C. § 1221.
... See id. §§ o31-o4o.
"
21d. § 453.
"I See, e.g., id. §§ z67, 1245, 1250, 1251.
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flow accounting. Subsequent sections of this Part will consider
applications of these principles.
B. Life Insurance and Annuities
i. Life Insurance. - Life insurance is generally of two types:
"term insurance" and "permanent insurance." Term insurance
represents a payment designed to protect an individual's family
against economic loss due to premature death. In effect, term in-
surance is a gamble that the individual will not outlive the period
predicted by mortality tables. Permanent insurance provides a
combination of term insurance and a significant element of sav-
ings in the form of reserves accumulated out of premium pay-
ments which earn interest for the insured's benefit. Under the
income tax, life insurance premiums are not deductible and
amounts which are paid "by reason of the death of the insured"
are not subject to income tax - regardless of the amount of
mortality gain or loss or return of interest earnings which may
actually be involved." 4 These rules result in preferential income
tax treatment of interest earned on savings in the form of cash
value life insurance.
The appropriate treatment of term insurance under an ex-
penditure tax may be controversial since life insurance is the
only generally available method by which individuals may pro-
tect their families against the economic consequences of pre-
mature death. Most commentators have recommended that term
insurance be treated similarly to purchases and receipts of in-
vestment assets generally; premiums paid for life insurance would
be deductible by the payor and proceeds would be taxed to the
beneficiaries. 115 If such rules prove acceptable to Congress, they
should be adopted.
On the other hand, allowing life insurance to be treated under
the Yield-Exemption option would avoid imposing tax upon the
death of the insured, when the family may well suffer a net eco-
nomic loss even. if it receives insurance proceeds. In fact, it is
entirely possible that the actual economic loss to the family will
be greater as mortality gains increase. If insurance proceeds are
used to enable the decedent's dependents to maintain their stand-
'Id. § zoi(a).
"
5 The Treasury Department justifies this treatment on the ground that the
purchase of an insurance policy lowers the lifetime consumption of the policy-
holder and increases "the expected lifetime consumption" of beneficiaries, BLUE-
PRINTs, supra note 3, at 132. Professor Andrews argues that allowing a deduction
for premiums would enable individuals to purchase greater amounts of insurance
and would therefore offset any hardships resulting from taxation of mortality
gains. See Andrews, supra note 3, at 1164. In addition, rules that treat life insur-
ance the same as other investment assets would have the advantage of simplicity.
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ard of living during the period shortly following the insured's
death, assessing expenditure tax at the time of death may be
burdensome to the family. But any hardship from taxing pro-
ceeds would be offset somewhat because subsequent investments
made with such proceeds would be immediately deductible. Thus,
applying graduated rates to life insurance proceeds under an ex-
penditure tax would create less severe difficulties for the de-
ceased's family than would similar treatment under an income
tax. By contrast, the arguments against taxing mortality gains
from term insurance do not apply to proceeds from permanent
insurance attributable to the build-up of life insurance reserves.
Expenditure tax should be applied to the savings. If Yield-
Exemption treatment is limited to mortality gains, premiums
should be deducted and the portion of proceeds which represents
interest income and return of savings should be included in the
beneficiary's receipts." 6 Because this division would be difficult
to administer, however, a simpler solution to the entire life in-
surance problem should be adopted. Life insurance could either
be treated on a cash-flow basis, like other investment assets, or on
a Yield-Exemption basis. The political pressure for exempting
life insurance proceeds from receipts will likely be great, and
rather than normal cash-flow treatment, the result may well
prove to be both an immediate deduction for premiums and an
exemption for proceeds." 7  Yield-Exemption treatment, which
would deny deductions for term life insurance premiums but ex-
clude such proceeds from receipts, should thus be considered an
acceptable alternative, assuming that coordination of such a rule
with the treatment of annuities would be feasible.118
If a Yield-Exemption treatment of life insurance were adopted,
proceeds received upon surrender of cash value life insurance
policies during the lifetime of the insured should also be ex-
cluded from tax receipts. Rules would have to be developed,
however, to ensure that application of the Yield-Exemption option
116 Allocating taxable amounts to individual beneficiaries would create difficult
information and policing problems, and if tax were not withheld by life insurance
companies, collection might prove difficult. At a minimum, beneficiaries would
have to be provided information by life insurance companies indicating the portion
of proceeds to be included in receipts.
"
7 See p. 1634 infra.
"'A transaction that may cause difficulty is the joint life insurance-an-
nuity contract. Under contracts of this type, the insurance company bears no risk
with respect to the death of the insured, and favorable treatment of the proceeds
of the insurance contract has been disallowed under the income tax. See Helvering
v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941) ; Kess v. United States, 451 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir.
1971); Rev. Rul. 65-57, 196S-1 C.B. 56. Similar rules would be necessary under
the expenditure tax if cash-flow treatment of annuities and Yield-Exemption for
insurance were permitted.
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to life insurance would not become a general opportunity to
obtain exclusion of speculative gains, through "variable life in-
surance" policies, for example, in which premiums are invested
in the stock market by life insurance companies and proceeds
depend upon how well the investments perform.
2. Annuities. - The treatment of annuities under an expend-
iture tax would be much simpler than the present system of
excluding a portion of each payment as a recovery of capital." 9
At present, the amount to be excluded is determined by the life
expectancy of the person or persons whose lives measure the
period of the annuity. The annuitant's income tax may be ex-
cessive if she dies prematurely and capital is not returned free
of tax, but annuitants may also receive tax-free more than the
amount paid for the annuity. Although considerations similar to
those advanced above in connection with life insurance might
seem to argue .for Yield-Exemption treatment of annuities, an-
nuity returns represent mortality gains only if the taxpayer out-
lives the actuarial prediction of the issuer, and similar hardships
do not seem likely to occur. An annuity should be treated under
an expenditure tax like any other investment; a deduction should
be allowed for purchases of annuities and annuity proceeds should
be included in receipts as they are paid.
C. Consumer Durables and Housing
The purchase of a consumer good which provides benefits
beyond the taxable year of purchase necessarily involves an ele-
ment of "savings" in the form of consumption deferred to a later
taxable period. Examples of such purchases are household furni-
ture and appliances, certain types of clothing, automobiles, and
yachts. In some instances, items not generally thought of as
durables, season tickets to the theater or opera, for example, in-
volve purchase in one taxable year with use extending into sub-
sequent taxable years.
Certain goods, such as jewelry and works of art, have "invest-
ment" as well as consumption aspects. Housing is typically the
most expensive and most enduring of consumer durables, and, in
a time of rising housing prices, often turns out to be a family's
most important investment. It is important to determine the
appropriate expenditure tax treatment of purchases of such assets
and of gains and losses upon disposition. The basic problems are
complicated because purchases of consumer durables and housing
are quite often financed by borrowing, with larger loans usually
secured by the asset purchased.
1
'See I.R.C. § 72.
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i. Ordinary Consumer Durables. - Theoretically, an expend-
iture tax should tax consumption as it occurs and exempt amounts
put aside for future consumption. 2 ° This could be accomplished
by treating durables like financial assets; an immediate deduction
would be allowed for the cost of the durable, and its "yield" (an
imputed rent) and sales price, if any, would be taken into re-
ceipts. This would have the virtue of treating purchasers and
renters of consumer goods equally, since the latter would be
taxed annually on nondeductible rental payments.
In practice, however, measuring the annual rental value to
be imputed to consumer durables would be extremely difficult.
For many durables, rental markets do not exist; for many others,
rental prices vary depending upon terms, warranties, and other
conditions. The amount to be imputed as rent could only be de-
termined by selecting an arbitrary yield on the cost of durables.
Moreover, the average taxpayer would find it difficult to under-
stand any scheme that allowed an immediate deduction for the
purchase price of a good and imputed annual rent as income
until disposition of the good.
In light of these administrative difficulties with the theoreti-
cally correct approach, Yield-Exemption treatment of the pur-
chase of consumer durables (i.e., denying an immediate deduction
but ignoring income from the asset) should be considered instead.
It is true that, as in the case of financial assets, 2 ' Yield-Exemp-
tion treatment is not equivalent to allowing an immediate deduc-
tion under the conditions that actually exist in the tax system,
but the real world absence of the conditions sufficient for the
equivalence between immediate imposition of tax and subsequent
taxation of yield and sale price is not as troublesome in the
case of consumer durables as with financial assets generally.
For several reasons, the two forms of treatment would produce
roughly equivalent results in the case of consumer durables.
First, although speculative gains and losses from the purchase
and sale of consumer durables are not unknown, they are
far less common than similar gains and losses from the purchase
and sale of investment assets, and can be taken into account in a
120 Although the literature is somewhat confused, there is widespread agreement
among analysts as to the theoretically appropriate treatment of consumer dur-
ables. It is, nevertheless, important to repeat that analysis so that the practical
rules offered here may be measured against the theoretical norm. Only then may
they be properly evaluated as concessions to administrative convenience or tax-
payer understanding.
121 Allowing an immediate deduction for a durable's cost and including only
the subsequent sales price, if any, in income would generally permit tax-free con-
sumption to the extent of foregone interest on the initial purchase price and
depreciation of the good.
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limited way without undermining the basic integrity of an ex-
penditure tax. Second, changes in tax liability due to progressive
rates or legislatively altered rates will be less significant for
relatively short-lived consumer durables. Third, the nature of
the income from durables- imputed rent-renders incompre-
hensible to the average taxpayer, and makes difficult to administer,
treatment such as that recommended for financial assets.
Moreover, differences in returns from consumer durables are
frequently attributable to "consumer surplus" - the difference
between the price and the amount the purchaser would have been
willing to pay-rather than to subsequent events which, in
effect, change the assets' yield. Whether consumer surplus exists
at the time of purchase is known only to the purchaser and simply
cannot be taken into account for tax purposes. Expectations at
the time of purchase must necessarily be measured by reference
to market prices.
Accepting market prices as the touchstone, returns from
typical consumer durables (such as automobiles) may be regarded
as more predictable than returns from financial assets (such as a
motion picture or real estate investment or the purchase of com-
mon stock). Gains on consumer durables are infrequent, and
losses on consumer durables will tend to occur either because the
consumer was mistaken at the time of purchase about the satisfac-
tions that the good would yield or because the product was de-
fective. Taking the former losses into account would require
exploration into consumers' subjective preferences. Losses from
product defects are reflected to some degree in the prices of
durables which vary, for example, with the availability of war-
ranties. As under the present income tax, extraordinary casualty
losses in excess of a certain amount but limited to original cost
(or value, if less) might be deductible. Allowing deductions for
such losses only when the casualty occurs relatively early in the
asset's expected useful life might also be appropriate. Alterna-
tively, if the cost of insuring durables is assumed to be a general
cost of use, no deductions for casualty losses should be per-
mitted.
In sum, cash purchases of ordinary consumer durables should
not be deductible, the asset's yield (imputed rental value) should
be ignored, and subsequent sales price generally should be ex-
cluded from receipts. In order to avoid problems of taxpayer
manipulation, this Yield-Exemption treatment of consumer dur-
ables should be mandatory. 2
12 Such rules are generally consistent with the present income tax treatment
of purchases of consumer durables (omitting for the moment the deduction of
interest on borrowing for consumer purchases) and are similar to those recom-
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The discussion of consumer durables has thus far proceeded
on the assumption that the original purchaser holds the item
throughout its useful life. When durables are transferred to
another, however, it becomes important to assure that an ap-
propriate amount of total tax is paid and properly allocated among
the owners. If the basic approach outlined above were followed,
the purchase of used durables, like the purchase of new durables,
would trigger the imposition of expenditure tax liability. If one
pays tax on the entire purchase price in the year of acquisition,
sale proceeds generally should not be included in the tax base
for reasons set forth in detail above in the discussion of financial
assets. 23 The value of typical consumer durables such as
automobiles, furniture, and appliances, will decline over time,
and the sale price will consequently be less than the purchase
price. When this is the case, it seems appropriate to disregard
any increase in value due to changes in market conditions since
the purchase of the asset. While the actual sale price may re-
flect not only the decline in value resulting from use of, but also
an increase in value due to changes in market conditions since
the purchase of the asset, it seems appropriate to disregard the
latter where the sale price is less than the purchase price. Hav-
ing imposed tax initially, it is theoretically inconsistent to impose
tax on sale; furthermore, it would be administratively impossible
to separate losses due to depreciation from offsetting gains (or
additional losses) resulting from changes in market conditions.
Absent a casualty loss, it is generally reasonable to assume that at
least some portion of the decline in value of consumer durables
is attributable to consumption use, and separating that amount
from any change in price due to market forces would be a prac-
tical impossibility. 2 4 Where the sale price exceeds the original
mended by others who have considered this issue. See ACIR REPORT, supra note 3,
at 21-26; MEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at i8o; S. LoIrN, supra note 3, at 76-82;
P. MimszKowsxI, supra note 3, at 22-24; BLUEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 121-22;
Andrews, supra note 3, at 1155-57. Professor Andrews and the Meade Commis-
sion, however, would limit the amount excluded on sale of the asset to the amount
originally included in the tax base as consumption, generally the purchase price of
the asset. See MEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 18o; Andrews, supra note 3, at 1158-
59-
123 See pp. 1583-86 supra.
.
24 A rule including some portion of proceeds in income would also be compli-
cated by the treatment of trade-ins. While, for example, a taxpayer would not
recognize any receipt on the trade-in of a used car, analogous treatment of a tax-
payer who sells his car and later purchases another would require limited deduc-
tions for purchases of consumer durables and would be difficult to administer.
Proceeds from sales of used durables would have to be traced, or an aggregate lim-
itation on the deduction based upon sales of used durables and purchases of other
durables would be required.
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purchase price, on the other hand, different considerations obtain.
As a general matter, it seems reasonable to assume that when
used goods sell for more than their original cost, market forces
other than ordinary interest and depreciation have affected the
price. Viewed ex post, if sales were not taken into account when
the sale price exceeds the purchase price, either an amount of
consumption or a speculative gain on the durable would be ex-
cluded from the base. Although sale price will exceed purchase
price only rarely in the case of typical consumer durables (for
example, when an automobile becomes a "classic car") this may
occur rather frequently for certain types of durables, such as
jewelry and works of art, which typically do not depreciate.
For example, assume that an individual purchases an oriental
rug at the beginning of year i for $i,ooo and sells the rug at the
beginning of year 3 for $3,000. The theoretical analysis sug-
gests that the individual has enjoyed some consumption in the
form of imputed rent while owning the rug. If the asset were
sold for an amount equal to its purchase price plus an interest
return ($1,210 in the example, assuming a io% rate of interest)
and the proceeds of sale were not included in receipts, this con-
sumption would escape tax completely. If the asset were sold
for an amount greater than its purchase price plus interest
($3,000 in the example) and the excess over the purchase price
plus interest (the speculative gain) were not taken into account
for tax purposes, an additional amount of future consumption
($3,000 minus $1,210 in the example) could be enjoyed free of
expenditure tax. 2 5
Requiring any excess of sale price over purchase price to be
included in the expenditure tax base would eliminate such pos-
sibilities of additional tax-free consumption. Taxpayers would
not be able to purchase nondepreciating durables as a means of
enjoying tax-free consumption due to speculative gains. Wide-
spread availability of such an opportunity would undermine the
efforts discussed in Section A above to design rules for financial as-
sets to assure that consumption financed out of speculative gains
would be included in the tax base. To the extent, however, that
a portion of the excess of sale price over purchase price rep-
resents a normal interest return, taxing such amounts at the
time of sale would result in overtaxation since the initial tax on
the durable's purchase price includes expenditure tax prepay-
ment with respect to normal interest returns. Nevertheless, this
may generally be ignored, since for typical durables the taxpayer
has chosen to forego the normal interest return in exchange for
125 Speculative gain would also be realized if the asset were sold for normal in-
terest return on the purchase price but the asset had depreciated in the interim.
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the use of the asset. In the case of nondepreciating durables,
such as art or jewelry, which are enjoyed by the purchaser, an
interest return has also often been foregone for using the asset,
and the entire excess of the sale price over purchase price may
reasonably be regarded as due to market forces, and thus an
appropriate subject of tax. Theoretical purity would require
distinguishing these cases in an effort to determine the portion
of the sale price attributable to a normal interest return; for
example, taxpayers who actually wear jewelry might be treated
differently from those who merely store it. But practical con-
siderations argue against such an approach. For most durables,
sale price will be less than purchase price and the issue will not
arise. For durables the sale price of which is greater than his-
torical cost, it does not seem unreasonable simply to include the
excess in receipts.
2. Consumer Credit. - Section A suggested that borrowing
for investment in financial assets be treated on a cash-flow basis
with loan proceeds included as receipts and repayments of prin-
cipal and interest deducted. For much consumer borrowing, how-
ever, such treatment is impractical. Many taxpayers would find
it quite difficult to determine exactly their consumer borrowing
and repayments for each year, and new information reporting re-
quirements, burdensome to lenders, would likely be necessary
under an expenditure tax system that required unsecured con-
sumer borrowing to be taken into account. It therefore seems
necessary, as a practical matter, to omit typical unsecured con-
sumer borrowing from receipts. This leaves two questions: (i)
What is the appropriate scope of the omission of consumer bor-
rowing from expenditure tax calculations? and (2) What rules
will apply when borrowing is omitted?
The guidelines for the latter question have been presented in
prior discussions of this Part.'26 In general, omitting consumer
borrowing from expenditure tax calculations would entail exclud-
ing loan proceeds from the tax base and disallowing deduction of
principal or interest repayments. If interest deductions were
allowed when loan proceeds were included in receipts, parity
would require that no deduction for interest be allowed when
loan proceeds are omitted from receipts. The denial of a deduc-
tion for interest under such circumstances may be viewed as in-
creasing an individual's tax liability by an amount which cor-
responds to the interest on the tax deferred by omitting loan
proceeds from receipts.
When consumer durables are purchased with borrowed funds
which are omitted from receipts, denying a deduction for the
121 See pp. i599-6oo supra.
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original purchase has an effect comparable to including in annual
receipts a rental value attributable only to the taxpayer's equity
in the durable, even though the taxpayer is enjoying the use of
the entire durable without regard to how it was financed. Dis-
allowing an interest deduction on funds borrowed to finance
consumer durables would approximate the addition to receipts
necessary to reflect the consumption value of the durable which
would be taxed if its entire rental value were imputed annually.
In addition, other commentators have argued for denying an
interest deduction with respect to loans used to finance consump-
tion purchases on the grounds that such interest represents addi-
tional consumption expenditure.
Excluding consumer loans from receipts and allowing no in-
terest deduction on such loans would generally result in similar
treatment of taxpayers whether or not they borrow to finance
consumption purchases and would, in many common circum-
stances, approximate theoretically appropriate results. Including
cash purchases of consumer durables in the expenditure tax base
in the year of purchase and, in effect, including corresponding
purchases with borrowed funds in the tax base as principal and
interest on the loan are paid (since no deductions are permitted
at that time), would, however, enable taxpayers using borrowed
funds to spread the taxation of consumption over a number of
taxable years. When durables are financed with borrowed funds,
taxation would follow the schedule for loan repayments and
would therefore permit self-help averaging in some cases. Finally,
the simplification advantages of this approach are substantial.
Limitations on the ability to exclude borrowing from expend-
iture tax receipts merit attention. If a progressive expenditure
tax is intended to be applied to a base which annually measures
taxpayers' consumption as accurately as possible, cash-flow treat-
ment of borrowing should be the general rule. Consumer loans
would be permitted an alternative treatment of exclusion from
receipts principally for reasons of administrative ease and tax-
payer convenience and understanding. Because denying deduc-
tions for interest on excluded loans would significantly reduce
any advantage which might occur because of the initial exclusion
of the loan proceeds, however, limitations on this exclusion alter-
native may be quite generous so long as interest deductions are
denied.
There are basically two alternative methods for limiting the
scope of the exclusion of borrowing from receipts in the case of
consumer credit. One method would be to allow borrowing to be
omitted only up to a specified amount, say $io,ooo, and require
all borrowing in excess of that amount to be included in receipts
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and treated under the standard method. 12 7 If the ceiling were
sufficiently high, this alternative would exempt many low and
moderate income families from the reporting burdens discussed
above. To be sure, for the family with two heavily mortgaged
cars and numerous credit card and charge account purchases,
however, a higher ceiling would seem necessary to eliminate
recordkeeping problems. But a ceiling set as high as $25,000
would permit borrowing to purchase financial assets, and would
tend either to complicate significantly the rules for deduction of
purchases of financial assets or to permit unwarranted results
such as those described in Section A.128
As an alternative to a specified dollar limit, borrowing could
be exempted from tax and interest deductions denied only when
indebtedness is incurred or continued to purchase or carry items
for personal consumption. Such a rule would require tracing
borrowing to its uses, but this is now required to some extent
under section 16 3 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code. Methods
used under that provision for distinguishing borrowing for in-
vestment purposes from borrowing for personal purposes could
be applied in an expenditure tax context. These rules are not
completely satisfactory, however, and are of limited application
under current law because dollar limitations restrict their ap-
plicability to a relatively small number of taxpayers. On balance,
then, a dollar limitation, which does not require tracing loan
proceeds to their use, seems preferable.
3. Housing.- Housing may be regarded simply as an espe-
cially expensive and enduring consumer durable. From this per-
spective the theoretically appropriate treatment of housing under
an expenditure tax is similar to that of other consumer durables;
persons who rent housing would not be allowed any deduction
for rent (which would be taxed as consumption), and an imputed
rental value should be taxed to owner-occupiers. If rental value
were imputed to owner-occupiers, it would be appropriate to
treat the purchase and sale of housing in the same manner as
financial assets generally; the cost of a home and of any repairs,
maintenance, or improvements would be deducted as incurred,
and the sale price would be included in full as a receipt at the
time of sale. Likewise, home mortgage indebtedness would be
treated on a cash-flow basis.'29
127 This approach was suggested by both the Meade Commission and Professor
Lodin's report, with limitations in the range of $2,5oo to $7,5oo. MADE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 179 (i1ooo) ; S. LODIN, supra note 3, at 78 (3o,ooo kr.).
128 See pp. i598-3611 supra.
129 Richard Slitor, for example, would allow a deduction for the purchase price
of owner-occupied homes and include in consumption each year a ratable portion
of the purchase price based upon an assumed useful life. See Slitor, supra note I8,
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As in the case of consumer durables, however, there are serious
practical obstacles to implementing this theoretically correct re-
sult. For the imputation of rent to owner-occupiers to be pre-
cise, annual appraisals for every owner-occupied home would be
necessary, and account would have to be taken of capital improve-
ments made during the period of ownership. In addition to these
administrative problems, lack of understanding among taxpayers
would be a drawback. Moreover, for persons whose cash in-
comes were low relative to their imputed rental values, taxation
might well be onerous. For these reasons, as well as political
ones, imputation of rents under the income tax has never re-
ceived any real attention in Congress, and there is no reason to
expect it would be any easier to enact under a consumption tax.
It is therefore essential to explore other alternatives.
Perhaps the best solution for expenditure taxation of hous-
ing would be the treatment recommended for ordinary con-
sumer durables. Under such a system, cash purchases of housing
would not be deductible, yield (imputed rental value) would be
ignored, and any excess of subsequent sale price over original
cost would be included in receipts. Under such rules a provision
comparable to section 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code (which
excludes gain on the sale of a personal residence if the proceeds
are reinvested in a home) would likely be adopted. An exclusion
of a dollar amount of gain (such as a one-time $ioo,ooo exclusion
recently enacted by Congress) 130 would not be necessary, how-
ever, because the general expenditure tax rules would allow off-
setting deductions for the cost of investment assets purchased
with the proceeds of sale. No adjustment would generally be
required when houses are sold at a loss, but, as in the case of
consumer durables, a limited deduction for casualty losses seems
appropriate.
Home mortgages could be treated in a manner similar to other
consumer credit. Amounts borrowed would not be included in
receipts and no deduction would be allowed for repayments of
principal or interest. To equalize treatment of renters and home-
owners, it would also be appropriate to deny any deduction for
property taxes.
The consumption tax base would include (i) the original cash
at 239-40. Professor Andrews suggests allowing an owner-occupier to deduct the
original purchase price (or the downpayment) of his home with income imputed
to him at a specified interest rate on the amount deducted. See Andrews, supra
note 3, at 1158 n.1o2. Both the Meade Commission and Professor Lodin
would require a fixed annual imputation based upon a rate of return on the
annual value of property (in Britain, 3% of the value and in Sweden, 5%). See
MEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 219-20; S. LODIN, supra note 3, at 83-89.
'°See I.R.C. § 121.
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downpayment on the purchase of housing, (2) mortgage pay-
ments of principal and interest, (3) property taxes, and (4)
costs of repairs, maintenance, and improvements. To the extent
that the return from housing approximates a typical rate of return
on the owner's equity, including these costs in the consumer's
tax base should put owner-occupiers on a tax basis approximately
equal to that of renters. In the long run, rental payments can
be expected to cover the owner's interest expenses, property taxes,
repair and maintenance costs, and a rate of return on invested
capital. Remaining disparities between homeowners and land-
lords would be due principally to the difference between requiring
homeowners to prepay expenditure tax on their cash investment
(by including cash downpayments in consumption) and requiring
landlords to treat rental housing on a cash-flow basis as with
other investments.
As in the case of consumer durables, this treatment implicitly
assumes that when housing declines in value, the bulk of the
decline is attributable to use and should be taxed. Thus when
houses are sold for an amount equal to or less than their original
purchase price, no amount would be entered into consumption
tax receipts.
Because the rules that have been recommended would re-
quire the inclusion in receipts of the entire cash outlay for housing
and other major durables in the taxable year of purchase, they
would tend to overstate the amount of consumption for that year.
Spreading of the tax burden over a period of years would then
be necessary; without some form of averaging in a progressive
tax system, such consumption would be taxed at unduly high
marginal tax rates. Since general self-help averaging by taxpayer
election has been rejected with respect to consumer durables,
financial assets, and loans, a general averaging provision would
be necessary under an expenditure tax.
There are, however, certain political obstacles to the recom-
mended approach. For example, including mortgage interest and
property taxes in the tax base can be expected to encounter serious
resistance in Congress. Notwithstanding their theoretical inap-
propriateness under an expenditure tax, other benefits for owner-
occupiers might also be enacted, given the traditional political
preference afforded home ownership. If such special provisions
excluded a significant portion of housing consumption by owner-
occupiers from the tax base, allowing a deduction for rent might
then become appropriate to ensure equal treatment. The ultimate
outcome might well be to exclude from the expenditure tax base
most taxpayers' housing costs. Such a scheme would have two
undesirable consequences. It would misallocate resources by en-
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couraging taxpayers to overconsume housing relative to other
taxable forms of consumption; and it would create inequities
since the deductions and exclusions that would likely be enacted
would tend to be of greater value to persons in higher tax brackets.
Similar inefficiences and inequities currently exist under the in-
come tax, however, and do not seem to engender great congres-
sional concern. In any event, no allocative distortions would be
created under an expenditure tax by the failure to include un-
realized housing appreciation in income, since appreciation would
not generally be included in receipts until devoted to consumption.
It seems likely that even if housing were completely excluded
from the expenditure tax base, distortion would be less severe
than under the current income tax.
V. GIFTS AND BEQUESTS AND THE TAXATION
OF THE FAMILY
A. Choice of the Taxpaying Unit
In designing any personal tax system, an important threshold
issue is whether the filing unit is to be the individual or a group,
such as husband and wife or the entire family, including minor
children. Choice of filing unit is important in terms of tax
liability when rates are progressive. The arguments relating to
this choice under the income tax generally apply with similar
force in the expenditure tax context,'' although it seems more
reasonable to regard the family as the appropriate unit for meas-
uring consumption than for measuring the accumulation of in-
come or wealth. In contrast to present practice, application of a
progressive rate schedule to family units would have the effect
of taxing the children's income or consumption at their parents'
marginal rates, and seems likely to result in certain inequities.
As is demonstrated below, however, the appropriate expenditure
tax treatment of gifts and bequests strongly suggests the desir-
ability of a family filing unit under an expenditure tax. A family
"I1 The biases produced by the current system, especially by the joint or separate
filing election afforded married taxpayers, have prompted a number of analyses
by lawyers and economists which have helped to elucidate the issues at stake.
Unfortunately, however, recent discussions in the income tax context of whether
the individual or the family is the more appropriate unit for assessment of tax have
principally served to confirm that neither choice is free of difficulties. See, e.g.,
Rosen, Applications of Optimal Tax Theory to Problems in Taxing Families and
Individuals (Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dept. of Treasury 1976); Bittker, Fed-
eral Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389 (1975); McIntyre &
Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax,
90 HARv. L. REv. X573 (i977); ABA Simplification Report, supra note 31, at 665-
7X.
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filing unit is not without difficulties, to be sure. 132 There is the
problem of defining what is meant by a "family" in cases in
which related individuals live separately or unrelated individuals
live in the same household. There may also be political pressure
to maintain the presently favored status of earnings of low-bracket
children who are concededly part of the family.
B. Gifts and Bequests
z. Taxation of Donor or Donee. - Some commentators have
argued that gifts and bequests should be included in the incomes
of both the recipient and the donor.133 The better view, how-
ever, is that income or expenditure tax should be imposed only
once on gifts within a family -whether on the donor or on the
donee -since there is only one source of earnings and one case
of spending.
Under current law, gifts and bequests are excluded from in-
come of the donee or heir. 3 4 If an individual earns income and
donates some portion to another, the income is taxed to the donor
but not to the donee. It is debatable whether this treatment is
theoretically consistent with the concept of an income tax. Be-
cause the selection of an income tax implies some reliance on
sources rather than uses of funds, however, present rules are
defensible. In addition, since donors tend to be subject to higher
marginal rates than donees, present law inhibits somewhat the
shifting of income among family members to take advantage of
lower marginal tax rates which usually apply to children. 33
Under an expenditure tax, the structural issue is basically the
same - whether gifts should be taxed to the donor or the donee -
but the theoretical result seems more clearly compelled by the
premise that an expenditure tax is intended to impose a pro-
gressive levy on consumption. The donee, not the donor, will
spend the amount of the gift or bequest. Cash gifts and bequests
should thus be excluded from the donor's tax base and included
in the donee's receipts. As in the case of other cash receipts, the
132 See id.
133 See, e.g., H. SIMONS, supra note z6, at 125.
134 See I.R.C. § 1o2.
13' Under the income tax, in the case of inter vivos gifts of appreciated prop-
erty, taxation of gain is deferred until the asset is sold by the donee and is sub-
jected to tax at the donee's rates. I.R.C. §§ 102, xoi5. This rule enables taxpayers
with appreciated assets to shift income taxation of gain to family members with
lower rates, notwithstanding the general rule which taxes donors on amounts
transferred. Similar results can be achieved through bequests, and for most tax-
payers income tax on bequests can be avoided altogether. It seems quite unlikely
that Congress would respond more favorably to a proposal to tax gifts or bequests
as sales under an expenditure tax.
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donee should be allowed a deduction if the money is invested
but not if the amount transferred is consumed. A de minimis
provision on an annual basis should be adopted so that small
gifts among family members need not be taken into account for
tax purposes. When investment assets, rather than cash, are
transferred, no deduction should be allowed the donor because
a deduction was allowed at the time of purchase. Since the trans-
fer does not immediately add to the donee's consumption, no
amount should be included in the donee's receipts until the asset
is sold. At that time, the donee would include in receipts the
proceeds of sale. The problems of basis of gifts familiar under
the income tax would thus generally disappear under an expend-
iture tax. 38
The major disadvantage of taxing gifts to donees is that it
would permit families to use gifts to determine who shall be
subject to tax. Under a progressive rate schedule, transfers from
parents to children would shift tax to lower brackets. Taxing
gifts to donors would of course solve this problem, but would re-
quire treating gifts of investment assets as sales and, in addition,
disallowing any deduction for the gifts. Such treatment would
be undesirable because it would disadvantage gifts relative to
both retention of assets and sales whose proceeds are reinvested.
Moreover, in light of the current treatment of gifts and bequests
under the income tax, under which gain accrued at the time of
transfer is taxed only on disposition or escapes tax altogether, 187
it seems politically unlikely that Congress would require con-
structive realization of the value of a gift on transfer. This may
be the case even though tax avoidance possibilities would be
greater under an expenditure tax than under the income tax,
since the cost of assets would be deductible at the time of pur-
chase. Results comparable to those under current law could be
achieved if amounts previously deducted were "recaptured" and
included in the donor's tax base at the time of the gift.
If direct taxation of gifts to donors were regarded as an un-
duly complex or politically impractical means of preventing the
shift of tax liability to lower bracket taxpayers, an alternative
means would be taxation of shared family consumption at appro-
priate marginal rates. If a family unit, including husband and
136 The donee's basis in the asset would in effect be zero; all sale proceeds
would be included in receipts. Thus, an expenditure tax avoids many of the com-
plexities and recordkeeping difficulties which occur under the income tax in de-
termining basis of donated or bequeathed property.
'
3 1 See I.R.C. § 104 (stepped-up basis for bequests); id. § 1OI5 (carryover
basis for gifts). Section 1023, the limited carryover basis provision enacted in
1976 to deal with this problem, was postponed by legislation in 1978 and may
well be repealed.
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wife and any minor children, were selected as the unit for ex-
penditure taxation, the most troublesome opportunities for shift-
ing taxation to lower marginal rates would be foreclosed. Gifts
would not have tax consequences until amounts were transferred
out of the family unit. When such a transfer is made, imposing
expenditure tax at the donee's marginal rates would be appro-
priate because the donee will have an amount available for con-
sumption.
Taxing the family as a unit would not, however, inhibit intra-
familial accumulation of wealth and transfer of assets. The
problem of wealth transfer could be dealt with by taxing donors
on gifts and bequests, 138 but would be better addressed by an
effective and comprehensive wealth tax (perhaps in the form of
an estate and gift or accessions tax and perhaps coupled with a
periodic tax on trust assets) rather than by taxing gifts and
bequests under an expenditure tax, which presumably would be
enacted with a progressive rate schedule designed to tax periodic
consumption. 139
2. Transfer of Consumer Durables.- It has been suggested
that when consumer durables with long useful lives are trans-
ferred, the recipient should be treated as if he received cash and
purchased the durable in question, on the ground that inclusion
of the consumption value of the durable in the tax base of the
donor at an earlier period might not accurately reflect the good's
consumption value at the time of the gift. 4 Unanticipated events
subsequent to the time of purchase might have increased or de-
creased its value, and tax rates might have changed. Absent
such a rule, donees would enjoy greater consumption than they
would under the theoretically correct treatment of consumer
durables, which would include an imputed annual rental value in
the receipts of the individual who holds the durable.
The problem arises because of the treatment of consumer
durables recommended in Part IV, but if that treatment were
213 The ancillary rules for grantor and generation-skipping trusts and the tax-
ation of unrealized gains at death would remain quite complex. See pp. 1627-28
infra.
'39 This is not to say that an effective wealth tax could be easily instituted.
See MEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 317-66. See also G. COOPER, supra note oo,
at go-xxI.
'40 See Andrews, supra note 3, at 1163-64. Given the congressional proclivity
for enacting exceptions to estate and gift tax rules for gifts of certain types of
assets or gifts to certain recipients, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 2057 (bequests to orphans) ;
id. § 1023(b) (3) (stepped-up basis for household effects), such a rule would likely
be burdened with exceptions. It is easy to imagine, for example, forgiveness of tax
on donations of a residence or even a work of art to a spouse or orphan. If num-
erous exceptions were required for political reasons, special rules for gifts of con-
sumer durables should be rejected on the grounds of complexity alone.
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generally acceptable, no additional tax should be imposed at the
time of a gift or bequest. The donor could hold and enjoy the
asset in question without paying additional expenditure tax. Im-
posing tax on a donee who receives an asset, such as a work of
art, that has appreciated since purchase by the donor would
require the donee to pay tax to retain the asset within the family
under circumstances in which no tax would be due if it were held
by the donor or sold and investment assets purchased. Expendi-
ture tax rules which would encourage a Rockefeller to sell art
to buy securities at least once each generation do not seem wise.
Moreover, delaying taxation until assets are sold would avoid
difficulties where donees are given assets, such as grandmother's
grand piano, which they do not really want, but which, for family
reasons, they cannot sell. On balance, assuming a scheme which
taxes gifts to donees, the treatment of gifts and bequests of con-
sumer durables should be consistent with that of other assets;
no deduction should be allowed the donor and no amount included
in the donee's receipts until he sells the asset. At that time, the
donee would be charged with receipts equal to the difference
between the sale price and the donor's purchase price; in other
words, the donee should receive a carryover basis, as he presently
does under the income tax.
3. Gifts in Trust. - As in the case of outright gifts, taxing
gifts or bequests in trust to donors rather than donees would
introduce complexities under an expenditure tax. If donees and
heirs were taxed, gifts of investment assets or cash in trust would
pose no special problems, and the taxation of trusts, which is
very complex under the income tax, would be quite simple. Since
trusts do not engage in consumption, there would generally be
no expenditure tax at the trust level, whether income or assets
were accumulated or distributed.'41 A gift from a donor to a
trust would be treated by the donor like any other gift. The trust
would not be taxable on receipt of cash or assets, but its bene-
ficiaries would include in receipts any distributions made from
a trust, whether out of income or out of corpus. If amounts
distributed by the trust were reinvested by the beneficiary, a
deduction would be allowed; if the trust proceeds were consumed,
the beneficiary would be taxed. It would therefore not be neces-
sary to adopt rules similar to those under the income tax which
distinguish simple trusts (which distribute all of their income) 142
141 The deferral of tax which would occur as a result of investments and
accumulations of income at the trust level would provide no particular expendi-
ture tax advantage since similar deferral could be obtained through investments at
the individual level.
142 See I.R.C. §§ 651--652.
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from complex trusts (which accumulate income). x43 Likewise,
the income tax throwback rules 114 would not be necessary under
an expenditure tax. Rules which distinguish grantor trusts from
other trusts under the income tax could also be eliminated if
the basic scheme of taxing donees on gifts were adopted. If,
under the terms of the trust, property actually reverts to the
grantor, for example, through the exercise of a power of revoca-
tion, distributions from the trust would be included in the
grantor's receipts in the year of revocation. It would be neces-
sary, however, to adopt rules to ensure that tax avoidance is not
possible through the purchase of consumer durables, including
works of art and jewelry, by trusts. On the other hand, if it were
deemed desirable to tax the donor on amounts transferred by
gift or bequest, the taxation of transfers to trusts would be more
difficult. It would seem necessary to treat gifts of assets in
trust, like outright gifts, as if the donor had sold the asset at the
time of the transfer (or, at a minimum, to "recapture" amounts
previously deducted with respect to the asset). In addition, if
taxing gifts and bequests to donors is intended to ensure tax on
appreciation at least once a generation, rules taxing generation-
skipping trusts would become necessary.
4. Gift or Compensation? - Under the income tax, there have
been considerable difficulties in determining how to treat transfers
which occur in the context of a commercial relationship. Pay-
ments to widows of deceased employees have proved especially
troublesome.'45 If a transfer is characterized as a gift, it is ex-
cludable from the recipient's income 4 and, to the extent over
$25, not deductible by the payor. 41 On the other hand, if the
transfer is compensation for services, it is includible in the re-
cipient's income and often deductible by the payor. Under the
income tax, resolution of this issue depends upon the payor's
donative intent or lack thereof and the Supreme Court has ruled
that a trial court should determine the payor's intent by applying
its "experience with the mainsprings of human conduct." 148
Under an expenditure tax, taxing gifts to donees would make
this elusive inquiry unnecessary. Transfers of cash, for example,
should be deductible by the payor and includible in the recipient's
... See id. §§ 661-664.
144 See id. § 667.
145 See, e.g., Estate of Sydney J. Carter v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 6x (2d
Cir. 1971); Estate of William Enyart, i965 T.CIM. (P-H) f1 65,266.
4 I See I.R.C. § 102 (a).
... See id. § 274(b).
148 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (ig6o); cf. Estate of
Sydney J. Carter v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 61 "(1971) (similar circumstances
require similar findings regarding intent).
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receipts regardless of the motives of the parties. Some problems
would remain in the case of gifts by private persons in a non-
business context. While such amounts would be taxed to the
donee in any case, they should not be deductible by the donor
if they are in fact payment for consumption services. Administra-
tion of this rule would not be difficult, however. For small
amounts, the gifts deduction would in any case not be available
to the donor. And for larger cash transfers, abuse seems more
likely to take the form of not reporting the transaction at the
request of the donee-independent contractor who wishes to evade
the tax on his receipt.
VI. TAX INCENTIVES AND SUBSIDIES
UNDER AN EXPENDITURE TAX
The present federal income tax contains a number of pro-
visions which afford preferential treatment to certain kinds of
receipts and payments, in the form of special exemptions, deduc-
tions, credits, reduced tax rates, and deferral of tax liability.149
Such so-called tax expenditures represent deviations from a net
income tax structure and result in substantial revenue losses.150
Nevertheless, this form of indirect federal subsidy has been
increasingly popular with Congress as a means of directing in-
vestment and achieving various social policy goals, and similar
congressional desire to channel investment behavior via dif-
ferential tax treatment will likely persist under an expenditure
tax. In the context of an expenditure tax, however, designing
such incentives introduces new complexities.
Under the income tax, it is possible to favor particular invest-
ments by providing deductions or exclusions for income received
from preferred sources, or by allowing accelerated deductions of
capital investments and thereby permitting a higher after-tax
rate of return than would be available for investments generally.
Under an expenditure tax, purchases of investment assets would
be immediately deductible, and when such cash-flow treatment
is equivalent to an exemption of yield, the tax on investment
149 See generally STAFF oF JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., IST SESS.,
ESTImATES OF FEDERAL TAx EX ENDiTruRs FOR FISCAL YEARS 979-1984 (Comm.
Print i979) [hereinafter cited as COMI'TTE PRINT]; S. SURREY, supra note 84,
at 6; Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705 (1970).
20 Tax expenditures for fiscal 1978 were estimated at $1244 billion, constitu-
ting 26% of the federal budget. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, SETTING NATIONAL
PRIORIIES: THE 1979 BUDGET 315-18 (J. Pechman ed. I978). This amount is
projected to increase to $igo.6 billion for 1979 and to $270.3 billion by 1984. CoM-
lrTEE PRINT, supra note 149, at 13.
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income is zero. As a result, it would not be possible under an
expenditure tax, as it is under an income tax, simply to impose a
lower tax to favor specific investments. Instead, a negative tax
rate would be necessary to provide such inducements. This Part
examines the problems associated with providing tax incentives
for certain types of investments under an expenditure tax, focus-
ing on state and local bonds, charitable contributions, accelerated
depreciation for investment property, and life insurance.
A. Interest on State and Local Bonds
Notwithstanding periodic attacks from tax reformers, the
exclusion from income of interest on state and local bonds 1'1; is
among the most enduring features of the income tax, having been
in the law since its adoption in i913.152 The basic justification
for its continuation is that it allows state and local governments
to borrow at interest rates lower than those incurred by private
corporations on bonds of comparable risk, thereby reducing the
cost of capital outlays for projects such as schools and other
public buildings, highways, water and sewage systems, and anti-
pollution facilities. An ancillary effect of the exclusion is to pro-
vide windfall tax savings to individuals who would be subject to
federal income tax rates higher than the rate of marginal pur-
chasers.153
In recent years, various proposals have been advanced to tax
state and local bond interest while maintaining reduced interest
costs for state and local governments through a direct federal
subsidy. 54 However, even partial replacement of the tax benefit
151 I.R.C. § io3.
152 The exclusion was originally justified on grounds that federal taxation of
state and local obligations would be unconstitutional. See Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583-86 (1895) (taxing income from state and
municipal bonds held unconstitutional). While this rationale is of dubious validity
today, it has its modern adherents. See Tax Reform, r969: Hearings on the Sub-
ject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 9st Cong., xst
Sess. 2223-31 (I969) (statement of the National League of Cities, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors, and the National Association of Counties) ; id. at 2239-42
(statement of Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland).
"'The higher the ratio of yields on tax exempt to taxable bonds, the greater
the windfall to individuals and institutions otherwise subject to high marginal
rates of tax, and the greater the total revenue cost to the federal government rel-
ative to state and local government savings in interest charges. See E. Gaiswo.D
& M. GRAETZ, supra note 83, at 225-27; Graetz, Assessing the Distributional Effects
of Income Tax Revision: Some Lessons from Incidence Analysis, 4 3. LEGAL STUD.
351, 359-61 (i975).
154Such a bill was passed by the House in zg6g. See H.R. REP. No. 413,
91st Cong., ist Sess., pt. i at 172-74 (ig6g), but was deleted from the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 by the Senate Finance Committee in the face of virtually
unanimous opposition by state and local governments. For more recent proposals,
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with a direct subsidy has been unattractive to state and local
governments and has failed to muster a majority in Congress.
In light of this attitude, it may be useful to inquire into the
expenditure tax effect of an exclusion from receipts of interest
on state and local obligations.
As outlined in Part IV, the cash-flow treatment of investment
assets generally required under an expenditure tax would permit
an after-tax rate of return on investments equal to the before-tax
rate of return on the amount of consumption foregone by making
the investment.'55 But if the tax system is to provide a lower
interest cost for state and local debt than for corporate bonds
generally, some additional benefit would be necessary. As Part
IV suggests, if the yield and sale price of state and local bonds
were excluded from receipts, and no deduction were allowed for
the purchase of such bonds, there would be no reason to expect
the interest on state and local bonds to be lower than that on
ordinary corporate bonds. To maintain an advantage for state
and local borrowing, an exclusion of at least some portion of the
proceeds or some other benefit, such as a tax credit, would have
to be provided in addition to the generally available deduction.
Permitting both a deduction and an exclusion with respect to
state and local bonds would create a negative tax rate with regard
to income from that source which would vary directly with pur-
chasers' marginal rates of tax. A tax credit would also produce
a negative tax rate, but would be more neutral relative to in-
dividuals' marginal tax rates.
B. Charitable Contributions
Current income tax law provides a significant incentive for
gifts of appreciated property to charity. Gifts to public charities
of appreciated securities or real property are deductible at fair
market value even when greater than purchase price, so that the
unrealized appreciation of donated property escapes taxation. 56
Gifts of appreciated property are most common for persons in
upper income tax brackets and are an important source of private
voluntary support for colleges, universities, museums, and hos-
see H.R. REP. No. ioi6, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (state and local government
option to elect 35% federal interest subsidy upon issuance of taxable obligations) ;
S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. i43-5o (,978) (bondholder option to
treat municipal bonds as taxable and receive refundable credit of 67% of interest
received).
5 See pp. 16og-io supra (cash flow treatment of investment assets).
156I.R.C. § 170(a), (e); Treas. Reg. § I7oA-i(c)(i) to (2). By contrast,
where a sale of property (for example, inventory) would produce ordinary income
or short term capital gain, the donor's deduction is limited to the asset's cost. Id.
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pitals. 5' Apparently convinced that continuation of a full fair
market value deduction is essential to the well-being of these
institutions, Congress has rejected proposals to limit this practice.
Under an expenditure tax, a deduction would be allowed upon
purchase of investment property, including securities or real
estate. If an additional deduction were allowed for the fair mar-
ket value of property given to charity, its cost would be deducted
twice, once when purchased and again when donated. Thus, at
a minimum, the deduction for charitable contributions of property
should be reduced by amounts previously deducted, usually the
asset's cost. If the excess of fair market value over cost were
allowed as a deduction, the preferential income tax treatment of
gifts of appreciated property would be retained.
There is, however, no more theoretical justification for this
kind of preference under an expenditure tax than under an income
tax. Taxing donors only on cost (to avoid a double deduction)
would introduce considerable complexity into the tax system.
Taxpayers would be required to know the basis of assets donated
to charity and to retain records and make computations which
would not otherwise be required. A simpler and more theoret-
ically appropriate rule would be to limit expenditure tax char-
itable contribution deductions to gifts of cash. This rule, how-
ever, might seriously reduce donations to institutions of higher
education since gifts of appreciated property would be denied
tax advantages currently available. Likewise, split-interest gifts
of property in trust, which also particularly advantage colleges
and universities, would no longer be eligible for deduction.
A deduction only for cash gifts to charities also would pro-
duce lesser advantages to donors than the current income tax
deduction. Allowing an expenditure tax deduction for cash gifts
to charity merely equates such gifts with purchases of invest-
ment assets which are also deductible. Under the income tax, a
donor faced with the choice of giving to charity or saving for
his own or his family's subsequent consumption can only obtain
a post-tax rate of return on savings which is a function of his
tax rate times the pre-tax rate of return. Thus, for example, a
taxpayer subject to a sixty percent marginal rate will only obtain
four percent after tax of a ten percent pre-tax return. Under
an expenditure tax, however, his post-tax return on his reduced
consumption would equal the ten percent pre-tax return and the
relative cost of instead donating the cash to charity would be
greater than under the income tax. If recent empirical studies
25 7 See REPORT OF THE AssOcIATION or AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES, TAX REFORM
AND THE CRIsis OF FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION 7-8, 31 (1973), reprinted in
E. GISWOLD & M. GRAETz, supra note 83, at 443.
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showing a high price elasticity of charitable giving are correct,158
high income individuals would likely reduce their charitable
contribution substantially as giving became more costly. It is
therefore quite possible that an expenditure tax would either
have to permit charitable deductions for more than one hundred
percent of cash gifts or be accompanied by additional tax in-
centives or direct subsidies for charities.
C. Depreciable Assets
The current federal income tax in several instances permits
accelerated deductions for the cost of certain capital investments,
typically permitting amortization of assets before the expiration
of their useful lives. Examples are accelerated depreciation for
certain kinds of real property 15 9 and equipment including tangible
small business personal property, 60 rehabilitation of low income
housing,' 6' railroad rolling stock and improvements,162 certain
farming expenditures, 6 3 pollution control facilities,'64 and ex-
pensing of research and development costs. 6 5 Like other invest-
ments, such depreciable assets would receive cash-flow treatment
under an expenditure tax with an immediate deduction of the
asset's entire cost and taxation of receipts upon sale. Assuming
tax incentives for such classes of favored investments would con-
tinue to be desired under an expenditure tax, a negative tax rate
would again have to apply. Paul McDaniel has suggested that
[r]ealistic comparison of an expenditure tax with an income
tax should assume an expenditure tax that, for example, would
provide a 2oo% deduction for equity invested in low-income
housing, a i5o deduction for the equity investment in non-
residential buildings and a 1257 deduction for the equity
18 See Feldstein & Clotfelter, Tax Incentives and Charitable Contributions
in the United States: A Macroeconomic Analysis; Feldstein & Taylor, The
Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Estimates and Simulations with tho
Treasury Tax Files; Boskin & Feldstein, Effects of the Charitable Deduc-
tion on Contributions by Low-Income and Middle-Income Households: Evidence
front the National Survey of Philanthropy; Boskin, Estate Taxation and Chari-
table Bequests, all in 3 THE CozISiSON ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC
NEEDS, RESEARcr PAPERS (1977) (commonly known as the Filer Commission).
"
5 I.R.C. § 57(a)(2).
1 60 Id. § 179 (2o% deduction in first year).
6I Id. § 167(k) (6o month writeoff).
1 12 Id. § 184 (6o month writeoff) ; id. § i85 (5o year writeoff).
'13 Id. § i8o (immediate deduction for fertilizer, etc.); id. § 182 (immediate
deduction for land-clearing costs).
1"4 Id. § 169 (6o month writeoff).
161 Id. § i74 (immediate deduction).
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investment in used residential buildings with a useful life of
20 years or more.166
D. Life Insurance
As noted in Part IV, the theoretically appropriate treatment
of life insurance would be cash-flow, but Yield-Exemption treat-
ment of life insurance may be politically necessary and does not
seem to undermine tax administration. 6 Under Yield-Exemption,
premiums should not be deductible, so that the yield from savings
through life insurance would not receive favorable treatment
vis-a-vis other investments, as it now does under the income tax.
If favorable treatment were desired, it would again be necessary
to raise the post-tax yield from life insurance above the pre-tax
yield. But to the extent that favorable treatment of these invest-
ments is justified merely by a desire to create some opportunities
for tax-free saving, such treatment would no longer be warranted
under an expenditure tax.
E. Summary
Thus, while substitution of an expenditure tax for the present
income tax might stimulate investment generally,' special rules
would be necessary, as under the income tax, if Congress for
nontax policy reasons desires to provide incentives for particular
kinds of investments and direct appropriation of funds for such
purposes proves politically difficult. Proponents of an expend-
iture tax may take solace from the elimination of unintended
differentials which now often occur under the income tax and
from the difficulty of providing relative advantages for particular
kinds of investment which would erode the tax base. On the other
hand, observers of congressional behavior may suffer apoplexy
thinking about the distortions and inequities which would likely
occur if Congress were to persist in its income tax ways by offer-
ing relative expenditure tax advantages to investments in par-
ticular sectors of the economy.
VII. CoRPoRATE TAXATION
As a prelude to consideration of the impact on corporate tax-
ation of a shift from an income tax to an expenditure tax, it is
essential to explore briefly the role of the corporate income tax
in the current system. The dominant analytical posture justifies
"'
6 McDaniel, Comments on Expenditure Tax Design (by Michael Graetz), in
BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 4. These percentages follow the depreciation allow-
able under I.R.C. § 67.
167 See pp. x611-12 supra (treatment of life insurance).
168 See p. i576 & note 8 supra.
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a progressive individual income tax (and likewise a progressive
personal expenditure tax) by reference to individuals' "ability to
pay," and based on this criterion argues that all income should
be taxed equally regardless of its source. Under this view, tax-
ation of income at the corporate level is merely a mechanism
necessary to ensure that undistributed corporate income does not
escape taxation. 16 9 This theoretical posture suggests a criticism
of the current corporate income tax. Corporate earnings dis-
tributed to shareholders are taxed more heavily than other kinds
of individual income since they are subject to the corporate in-
come tax and taxed at shareholders' marginal rates.1 0 Undis-
tributed corporate earnings are, by the same token, undertaxed
if the corporate tax rate is less than the shareholder's marginal
rate and if the shareholder's tax can be deferred for a long period
of time and/or taxed at favorable capital gains rates. In virtually
all circumstances, present law creates an incentive for retention
rather than distribution of corporate profits and for distribution
of corporate income as deductible interest to bondholders rather
than as dividends to shareholders.'' The theoretically correct
reform of the current corporate income tax thus becomes evident.
The separate corporate income tax should be repealed and undis-
tributed corporate income should be directly attributed to share-
holders and taxed at their marginal rates. 2 If any tax were
continued at the corporate level, it would be only a withholding
tax which would be credited to shareholders as corporate income
is distributed or attributed to them. Corporations would be treated
merely as conduits for tax purposes and be taxed similarly to
partnerships and subchapter S corporations.
From this analytical posture, the fate of a corporate income
tax under an individual expenditure tax also becomes clear. Sub-
119 See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MusGRAVE, supra note 6o, at 270-71.
170 Thus, $iooo of corporate income is reduced to $5oo by a 5o% corporate
income tax, and further reduced to $i5o when distributed to a shareholder with
a 70% marginal rate, or to $4oo when distributed to a shareholder with a 20%
marginal rate. Although both shareholders end up with less than they would
have if the $iooo had been earned by them individually ($3oo and $goo, respec-
tively), it is the lower bracket shareholder who pays the greater additional tax
as a result of the separate tax on corporate income. Taxes on account of his dis-
tribution are increased from 20% to 6o%, while the corresponding increase for
the 70% shareholder is from 70% to 85%.
171 See The President's x978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6144, 6153-55
(1978) (statement of Michael Graetz).
172 See BLUEPRmTS, supra note 3, at 69. The practical difficulties of doing
this are discussed in C. McLuRa, MUST CORPORATE INComE BE TAXED TwICE?
146-84 (1979); Nolan, Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes,
30 S. CAL. TAX IxsT. 899 '(978); ABA Simplification Report, supra note 31, at
595-620.
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stitution of an expenditure tax for an income tax would eliminate
the need to allocate undistributed corporate income to share-
holders because an expenditure tax would not in any case apply
until funds are devoted to consumption. To the extent that
taxation of business is regarded as complementary to the taxation
of individuals, a decision to move to a tax on consumption at the
individual level therefore implies elimination of taxes on business
income; businesses are engaged in production, not consumption.
Amounts earned by businesses and retained for additional invest-
ment would be exempt from tax just like amounts invested and
saved by individuals. Amounts distributed from businesses to
their owners would be included in the owners' receipts and taxed
unless invested or saved, but no additional tax would be imposed
on the business itself, whether it is a corporation, a partnership,
or a proprietorship." 3 Individuals would generally be allowed
deductions for purchases of corporate stock, and cash receipts
relating to stock ownership would be includible for expenditure
tax purposes whether in the form of dividends, return of capital,
or proceeds from the sale of stock.
Most proponents of expenditure taxation, however, would
probably like to uncouple the case for conversion to an individual
expenditure tax from any requirement that the corporate income
tax be repealed. The corporate income tax is a significant 74 and
popular source of revenue, and conditioning an expenditure tax
on its repeal would undoubtedly generate significant opposition,
while at the same time requiring higher rates or other sources of
taxation to produce equivalent revenues. Thus, proponents must
advance special reasons for imposing tax on corporations.
Since the corporate income tax predates the individual income
tax, arguments for its separate existence abound. Apart from
straightforward revenue considerations, these arguments do not
tend to rely on any separate "ability to pay" of corporations
distinct from that of their owners, but rather on special bene-
fits - such as limited liability - available only to corporations
and on nontax regulatory objectives - such as control of mo-
nopolies. The difficulty is that neither of these considerations
necessarily implies corporate profits as the appropriate tax base.'
A tax on corporate profits may, however, be justified solely by
reference to existing law. This argument, a sophisticated varia-
tion on the old-taxes-are-good-taxes theme, contends that the
173 See BLuEPRInTs, supra note 3, at 133-34.
174 In 1978 the corporate income tax accounted for about 259 of all income
tax revenue and 16% of gross revenue collections. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REv N E, supra note 72, at 9.
175 See R. MUSCRAVE & P. MusGRAVE, supra note 6o, at 271-74. See generally
R. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INcoME TAx (ig5x).
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corporate income tax has been "capitalized" and is now reflected
in share prices. 7 6 Present shareholders would enjoy windfall
gains as share prices increased in response to the removal of the
corporate tax. Moreover, since corporate profits distributed to
shareholders are already overtaxed, a corporate tax on distributed
profits would be no worse under an individual expenditure tax
than under the current income tax. These arguments might be
advanced to justify the continuation of a corporate tax, perhaps
even the present corporate income tax.
Retention of the corporate income tax in its current form,
however, is necessarily troubling to expenditure tax proponents.
First, to the extent that the basic case for expenditure taxation
turns on inherent difficulties of income taxation, these difficulties
would be retained at the corporate level. Thus, for example, the
need to distinguish realized from unrealized gains would con-
tinue, as would other timing problems of income taxation, includ-
ing the need for depreciation allowances and the distinction be-
tween capital and deductible expenses. In addition, the structural
difficulties of taking account of inflation under an income tax
would continue at the corporate level.' Moreover, efficiency
claims for expenditure taxation in terms of both neutral treat-
ment of alternative forms of investment and increased capital
formation would be lost at the corporate level. Finally, a cor-
porate income tax would necessarily abandon the "distinguishing
feature" of an expenditure tax: that the taxpayer receive a rate
of return on savings equal to the before-tax yield on investments.
As a result, expenditure tax proponents have either advocated
repeal of the corporate income tax 178 or have endeavored to
describe the form of corporation tax which would best harmonize
business taxation with an expenditure tax at the individual level.
Taking the latter course, the Meade Commission recommends a
"flow of funds" corporate tax base- essentially the excess of
total receipts from the sale of goods and services over total ex-
penditures relating to the purchase of such goods and services,
including purchases of capital assets. Since earnings which were
reinvested would not be taxed, the base would be equal to dis-
tributed profits - the "net amount of funds that were taken
by shareholders out of the corporate sector of the economy,"
generally the excess of dividends over new equity investments.'79
1176See MEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 227; Stiglitz, Taxation, Corporate
Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capital, 2 J. PuB. ECON. i (1973).
177 A principal argument in favor of the expenditure tax advanced by the
Meade Commission is the difficulty of defining income in an inflationary world.
See MEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 112.
'
78 See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 133-34.
179 See MEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 233-35.
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Rather than repeating the Meade Commission's analysis here, I
shall illustrate a flow-of-funds form of corporate tax by a simple
example which should make clear the relationship between such
a corporate tax and the expenditure tax treatment of investments
at the individual level.
Assume an individual has a salary of $40o and wishes to con-
sume $i5o after tax. Assume further that an expenditure tax
with a uniform rate of 5o% applies to individuals and that an
available investment will yield a before-tax return of i5%. If
the taxpayer invests $ioo he will be entitled to deduct that
amount and will pay a tax of $i5o on the remaining $300 tax
base, leaving $i5o for consumption after tax. Upon the sale
of the investment a year later, the $115 would be taxed, leaving
$57.50 for after-tax consumption, a i5% return on the $50 of
consumption foregone in order to make the investment.
The basic question is how to structure a corporate tax to pro-
duce similar results if the $ioo investment were in the form of
a contribution of capital to a corporation. If the $ioo capital
contribution were treated as a receipt at the corporate level, and
the $ioo corporate investment, say in capital goods, were treated
as an offsetting deduction, any tax at the corporate level (other
than purely a withholding tax) 180 imposed in addition to tax at
the individual level would reduce the amount of after-tax con-
sumption available to the taxpayer below $57.50. On the other
hand, if, as under the Meade Commission's proposal, the $ioo
of contributed capital were not treated as a corporate receipt,
the corporation would be able to purchase a capital asset costing
$200 (assuming that it could immediately deduct the cost of
capital assets, that the corporate tax rate is 5o%, and that
an immediate refund is available on losses or that the corporation
has other income against which it may offset the $2oo deduc-
tion). Under such circumstances, the corporation would be in-
vesting $ioo and the government contributing an additional $xoo
in the form of reduced tax or tax refund. If the asset produced
a i5% yield, it would return $230 after one year which, when
subjected to a 5o% corporate tax on distribution, would still
leave $ii5 to be distributed to the shareholder. This would
enable the shareholder to consume $57.5o, assuming again a
5o% expenditure tax on individuals.
If the funds were reinvested, no corporate tax would be im-
posed, but the government would continue to share in future
yields and would collect tax whenever funds are taken by share-
0 Under a withholding tax, any corporate tax would be refunded (probably
through tax credits) when amounts are distributed to shareholders and included in
their receipts.
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holders out of the corporate sector. The government would, of
course, be entitled to its 50% share of corporate profits when-
ever funds were distributed to shareholders, and, at the latest,
when the corporation terminates its existence, through a liquida-
tion, for example. Collection would, of course, be possible in the
case of a liquidation only if termination occurs when the company
still controls the assets and accumulated yield. In effect, the
government would have a share in the company's assets which
would be realized upon distributions to shareholders, and, in
general, the government would be indifferent as to the timing
of distributions.
Under such a system, it would be important to ensure that
shareholders could not obtain corporate earnings without imposi-
tion of the corporate tax. If, in the above example, a shareholder/
employee (or lessor) were able to obtain the entire $30 return
in the form of deductible salary (or rent), greater individual con-
sumption would be possible as a result of corporate investments.' 8 '
The appropriate treatment of debt and interest payments
under a flow-of-funds type of corporate tax is not free of doubt.
Some analysts recommend that payments to suppliers of finance -
whether in the form of dividends or interest -should be taxed
and therefore that no interest deduction should be allowed. 812
The Meade Commission, on the other hand, under its version of
the flow-of-funds tax, would permit deductions for interest, and
in general would treat corporate debt on the same cash-flow basis
as individual debt under the general expenditure tax rules. Thus,
difficulties in distinguishing debt from equity would remain. 8 3
Since post-enactment loans would be includible in receipts, how-
ever, while equity contributions would not, it would seem possible
simply to correlate the imposition of tax on distributions to
suppliers of capital with the treatment of that capital when
initially supplied. If no inclusion in receipts were required when
capital was received by the corporation, the government would
have a contingent tax claim when returns on such capital are
181 In addition, if such a tax system were adopted at the corporate level, it
would be inappropriate to allow any tax credits or other relief on amounts dis-
tributed to shareholders as dividends, for allowing such relief would, in effect,
reduce the tax on corporate investments below that applicable to other invest-
ments. See MEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 248-49.8 I See J. KAY & M. KING, THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 200 (1978).
183 The Meade Commission notes that "it would be necessary to prevent com-
panies from issuing debt to their shareholders at abnormally high interest rates,
so that the return on capital which had in fact been financed by share issues . ..
would be paid out as [deductible] interest on debt." MEADE REPORT, supra note
3, at 241. In this connection, the Meade Commission regards it as necessary to
treat interest in excess of a specified rate as a dividend distribution. Id.
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distributed; if capital were originally included in receipts, returns
would be regarded as deductible interest.
The Meade Commission argues that imposing a corporate tax
in this manner would produce revenue even though it would not
reduce the rate of return on corporate investment. With regard
to future transactions, this revenue allegedly would be produced
because "the government would receive a tax revenue from any
profits made by companies on their real transactions in excess of
the rate of interest on government debt." "' This would occur
because the government becomes, in effect, a joint venturer with
the corporation, contributing one-half of the original cost of the
asset ($ioo in the above example) and receiving one-half of any
returns distributed to shareholders. Revenue would also be derived
from gain relating to corporate assets on hand at the inception
of the tax. Distributed income from such assets would be fully
taxed even though the full cost of the asset might not have been
deducted in prior years.
Putting aside for the moment the question of "windfall gains"
for existing shareholders who presumably invested with the ex-
pectation of a continuing tax on corporate income, unless the
Meade Commission's argument depends upon expected increases
in the aggregate level of investment, it is difficult to understand
why its proposed corporate tax would be preferable to elimination
of any separate corporate tax (or conversion of the corporate
tax to a withholding tax). Returning to the prior example, if the
individual had invested in an unincorporated business, only $Ioo
of assets could be purchased, whereas under the Meade Com-
mission's corporate tax system, if he invested in a corporation,
he could obtain an additional deduction at the corporate level and
thereby purchase $200 of assets. To reach equivalent results
at the individual level, a deduction would have to be allowed for
an amount double the amount of the investment. It is difficult
to understand why $50 of foregone consumption at the individual
level should produce $200 for investment if contributed as capital
to a corporation, but only $ioo if otherwise saved or invested.
The government would, in effect, be participating as a joint ven-
turer in investments made by corporations in a manner different
from investments made directly by individuals.
If only the appearance of a corporate tax were desired (pre-
sumably for political reasons), a corporate tax could be designed
which would include contributions of capital in corporate re-
ceipts, but would be offset by a system of imputation and tax
credits at the shareholder level. Such a corporate tax would
serve simply as a withholding tax to be refunded to shareholders
"'
4 See id. at 230.
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whenever amounts were distributed and included in the share-
holder's receipts. Distortion would result, however, from lags
between collection of the tax at the corporate level and refund
at the shareholder level. In addition, an entire corporate tax
system might be necessary, even though no additional revenue
were intended to be collected from corporations. Conversion of
all or a portion of the corporate income tax to a withholding tax
on dividends might involve difficult practical problems which
have been discussed in connection with recent proposals to in-
tegrate the individual and corporate income taxes through a
system of imputation and tax credits.'85 Alternatively a straight-
forward withholding tax on distributions by corporations to share-
holders could be enacted to apply at a flat rate without any
calculation of corporate income or profits. Such a tax would be
available as a credit against shareholders' expenditure tax liability.
The distinguishing feature of the Meade Commission's pro-
posed flow-of-funds tax is that it provides a mechanism for col-
lecting some corporate taxes on existing investments made under
an income tax regime without distorting new corporate invest-
ment decisions made in the environment of an individual expendi-
ture tax. In so doing, it would eliminate any need to distinguish
dividends from returns of capital, to determine a taxpayer's basis
in corporate stock, to distinguish capital purchases and improve-
ments from deductible expenses, or to adjust corporate taxes for
inflation.
The Meade Commission estimates that the revenue yield from
a flow-of-funds corporate tax would be no less and might perhaps
be more than that now produced from income taxes on the cor-
porate sector. 8 Certain differences between the American and
British tax systems are noteworthy, however. First, many British
companies currently pay little or no corporate income tax because
of a system of "stock-relief" enacted in 1974 which has had the
effect of eliminating the corporate tax liability of British manu-
facturing companies.8 7 In addition, since 1973, payment of a
certain amount of corporate tax has been imputed to shareholders
in the form of a credit against their individual income tax liability
on dividends. This means that a significant amount of total
British corporate tax revenues are, in effect, withholding taxes.
Finally, the Meade Commission bases its revenue estimates on
the obviously unrealistic assumption that corporations' behavior
would remain the same under the new tax system. While a similar
effort at estimating the effects on revenue of a change to a flow-
18 See authorities cited note 172 supra.
188 MFADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 245. See also id. at 6i-65.
217 3. KAy & M. KING, supra note 182, at z76.
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of-funds corporate tax in the United States is beyond the scope
of this Article, it seems quite likely that revenue consequences
would be substantial, since no tax would be immediately due
with respect to retained earnings. A reduction in corporate tax
receipts on the order of fifty-percent or more would not be sur-
prising.
Repealing the corporate tax or converting it to a withholding
tax has serious additional implications. Elimination of the cor-
porate tax might, for example, require enactment of direct sub-
sidies to induce corporate investments which now receive tax-
preferred treatment or regulations or excise taxes to discourage
corporate expenses, such as those for grassroots lobbying, which
are now disallowed under the income tax. Moreover, concern
with "windfall gains" from repealing the corporate income tax
might produce long-delayed effective dates or a phase-out so
gradual as to interfere with the fundamental economic justifica-
tions for converting to an expenditure tax. If this appears likely,
the Meade Commission's proposal for a flow-of-funds corporate
tax would merit serious consideration. (Other possibilities, such
as a lump-sum tax on assets payable over a number of years,
should also be analyzed.) If, on the other hand, retention of a
separate corporate tax is predicated on considerations of revenue
alone or of corporate privileges (such as political power or limited
liability), various possibilities for corporate excise taxes (on
total assets or gross sales, for example) should be given atten-
tion.188
188 Another issue that should be mentioned is methods of accounting. Com-
mentators seem to agree that only the cash method of accounting for receipts and
expenditures would be appropriate under an expenditure tax. See, e.g., BLUEPRINTS,
supra note 3, at 135. In the case of a proprietorship, any excess of net receipts over
business expenditures would be added to the owner's receipts, and the owner
would be allowed a deduction if expenditures exceeded receipts. Likewise, cash
distributions from partnerships would be included in partners' receipts and con-
tributions to a partnership or amounts paid to purchase partnership interests
would be deductible by the individual partner.
The cash method of accounting is considered appropriate because an accrual
accounting system would often tax individuals on amounts not currently available
for consumption and would allow deductions for amounts not yet paid and there-
fore currently available for consumption. Certain cash method accounting prob-
lems which have occurred under the income tax would continue under an ex-
penditure tax. The constructive receipt doctrine, for example, would still be ap-
plied. See Hornung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428 (I967). On the other hand,
the cash equivalency doctrine, which has produced considerable litigation under
the income tax, would likely not produce significant expenditure tax problems be-
cause such issues tend to arise most frequently with regard to notes or other in-
vestment assets for which offsetting deductions would be available under an ex-
penditure tax. By the same token, as Part IV indicates, prepayments of expenses
other than year-end prepayments would not cause problems under an expenditure
tax to the same extent as under an income tax. Requiring businesses to keep
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VIII. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
A shift by the United States from income to expenditure taxa-
tion would have major implications for international transac-
tions.189 The industrialized countries have tended to assert rights
to tax residents and citizens on all income, regardless of where
earned, and to tax all income earned in their jurisdiction, regard-
less of the residence of the person who earns it. The United
States taxes its citizens, resident aliens, and domestic corpora-
tions on their worldwide income. 90 Nonresident alien individuals
and foreign corporations are taxed on income "effectively con-
nected with" the conduct of a United States trade or business
and on other items of United States source income through with-
holding taxes, although the latter are in many cases reduced or
forgiven. 91 United States citizens and residents are allowed tax
credits for foreign income taxes on foreign-source income, sub-
ject to rules limiting such credits to an amount not greater than
that determined by applying United States income tax rates to
foreign-source net income. " In addition, United States share-
holders of foreign corporations are generally not taxed on foreign
corporate earnings until such earnings are distributed to them.
The United States also provides tax relief to its citizens residing
abroad in the form of an exclusion from income of a specified
amount of earnings. 193  In addition, preferential treatment is
granted to domestic corporations on income derived from the
active conduct of business in a United States possession and to
"domestic international sales corporations" engaged in the ex-
books and records on a cash basis might, however, produce some additional costs
for companies which now maintain their books on the accrual method.
It is interesting to observe that methods of accounting under the expenditure
tax differ significantly not only from income taxes but also from value-added
taxes, under which accrual accounting is generally the preferred method for busi-
nesses. In Europe, for example, the value-added tax generally attaches at the time
products are delivered or services rendered and when the recipient becomes obligated
to pay, whether or not a cash payment is actually made. Similar results occur
under manufacturers' excise taxes in the United States.
If a separate corporate tax were continued in an expenditure tax regime, there
is no compelling reason to base such a tax on the cash method of accounting.
Accrual accounting should probably be allowed for purposes of the corporate tax,
but this should be regarded as a concession to taxpayer convenience rather than a
result required by theoretical considerations.
189 See generally MADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 411-30, 433-42; S. LODIN,
supra note 3, at io8-r4; P. MiEzxowsxi, supra note 3, at 48-57.
9 0 See generally W. GIroRD, TAxATioN or FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME (1977);
D. TLLINOHAST, TAX ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS (1978).
0' See I.R.C. §§ 871-896, 1441-1443.
19' See id. §§ 9oi--9o4.
19 See id. § 9ii.
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port of goods manufactured in the United States.194 Precise
relations among various industrialized countries' income tax rules
are typically governed by treaties. It should be clear from this
brief summary of United States income taxation of international
transactions that no single principle has governed congressional
policy. Although current policy tends in the direction of estab-
lishing neutrality among the industrialized countries with regard
to the taxation of income, there are important divergencies from
this principle.
It has been urged in an income tax context that countries tax
the worldwide incomes of their residents. 9 Although the defini-
tion of residence is difficult, the residence principle, if accepted
internationally, would also seem an appropriate basis for assess-
ing a progressive consumption tax. Receipts would be includible
without regard to their source; investments or savings, whether
in the United States or abroad, would be deductible; and con-
sumption would be taxed without regard to where it occurs. The
need for foreign tax credits would be eliminated and the pro-
gressive rate structure would be applied only once to all con-
sumption.'96 A graduated expenditure tax imposed on the basis
of residence would differ from other taxes on consumption, such
as the value-added tax, which are generally applied only to con-
sumption within the boundaries of the taxing jurisdiction.
The practical barrier to an expenditure tax system based
upon the residence principle is that international harmonization
would come slowly, if at all. Some industrialized countries would
probably retain income taxes, and taxing income based upon its
source (rather than its owner's residence) would remain attractive
to countries which are net importers of capital. Rather than
indulging the unrealistic assumption that with patience interna-
tional harmonization would occur and expenditure taxation on a
residence principle would be adopted throughout the industrial-
ized world, this Part briefly explores the problems that would
arise if the United States were to shift to expenditure taxation
while taxation in the rest of the world remained unchanged.
A. Consumption Abroad; Nonresident Aliens
The decision to individualize the tax on consumption through
a progressive rate structure clearly implies that United States
'See id. §§ 931, 991-997.
o See BLuEPRITs, supra note 3, at 98-ioi.
'o Likewise, if source were adopted internationally as the exclusive basis for
taxation, a foreign tax credit would not be needed In addition, if the United
States were to cease taxing on the basis of citizenship, there would be no problems
in taxing foreign earnings of nonresidents. None of these possibilities, however,
seems likely in the near future.
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residents (and perhaps nonresident citizens) should be taxed on
their consumption whether the consumption takes place here
or abroad; the expenditure tax is designed to tax individuals on
the basis of the amounts they consume, and it should not matter
where consumption takes place. Notwithstanding a general shift
from income to expenditure taxation of United States citizens
and residents, it does not seem appropriate for the United States
to eliminate its income -taxes on nonresident aliens or foreign
corporations or its withholding taxes on United States source
income earned by foreign residents until it obtains concessions
from other countries with regard to foreign-source income earned
by United States residents. Thus, for a substantial period of
time - at least until treaties can be renegotiated - the basic
income tax provisions (or at least withholding taxes) applicable
to foreign residents would have to be retained. Even though this
state of affairs would produce complexity and run counter to
United States tax treaty undertakings to treat investors from
treaty countries and domestic investors equally, limiting United
States taxation of nonresidents to their expenditures on consump-
tion in the United States does not seem immediately feasible or
desirable.
B. Foreign Investments
The treatment of foreign portfolio investments by individuals
should create few problems under an expenditure tax. Returns
from such investment receive a foreign tax credit for foreign
withholding taxes that are "grossed up," i.e., included in income
and credited against United States tax liability.'97 Typically,
such taxes are reduced or eliminated by treaties. If cash-flow
treatment were adopted for foreign investments under an ex-
penditure tax, similar treatment would be appropriate."
Investment by corporations in ten percent or more of the
stock of a foreign company would, however, present more serious
problems. Under present law, credits are allowed for foreign
taxes attributable to dividends paid.' 9 Since there would likely
be no determination of "dividends" as under present law and no
computation of "earnings and profits," a major rethinking and
restructuring of the foreign tax credit would seem to be required.
If adopting an expenditure tax at the individual level were
... I.R.C. § goi. Corporate portfolio investment of less than io% of the
stock of foreign companies is treated similarly.
108 If Yield-Exemption treatment were permitted foreign investments, all foreign
taxes would be ignored since all returns are excluded from the expenditure tax
base.
199 I.R.C. §§ 901, 902.
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accompanied by repeal of the corporate income tax, the most im-
portant harmonization question would be whether foreign tax
credits relating to income of foreign subsidiaries of United States
corporations should be allowed as credits to United States share-
holders. Allowing such credits could become quite complex; it
would be particularly difficult to determine the applicable in-
dividual tax rate to serve as a limitation on allowable credits. 00
Since income which is reinvested would be subject to a zero rate
of United States tax, no credits should be allowed with regard to
undistributed income. Since income earned domestically would
be taxed on a cash-flow basis, similar treatment should apply to
income earned abroad. Foreign taxes paid with respect to dis-
tributed income would be included in shareholder's receipts.
The shareholder would then compute his tax on the basis of the
"grossed up" dividend, and take a credit for the amount of
foreign tax paid."0' Including foreign taxes in income and credit-
ing such taxes should achieve equal treatment of domestic and
foreign investment regaidless of the tax rate of the foreign
country or of the individual investor, assuming that the pre-tax
returns on investment in the two countries are identical." 2
On the other hand, it might be argued that allowing imputa-
tion and credit would, in effect, treat foreign corporate income
taxes as if they were withheld expenditure taxes of the individual,
and that foreign taxes should not be imputed and credited with
200 See ABA Simplification Report, supra-note 32, at 617-20, for a discussion
of some of these problems.
'0 If grossing up were not required and if individuals were allowed both an
immediate deduction for the purchase of investment or business assets and foreign
tax credits with respect to such investments, the post-tax rate of return on reduced
consumption would exceed the pre-tax rate of return on foreign investments
while the post-tax rate of return would equal the pre-tax rate of return on do-
mestic investments. Assume, for example, that an individual subject to a 5o
expenditure tax rate wishes to reduce his consumption by $5oo and invest $iooo.
He is considering choosing between two investments in similar companies. Com-
pany A will earn $ioo domestically which will be distributed as dividends. Company
B will earn $ioo through foreign subsidiaries abroad, will pay foreign income
taxes on that income of $2o, and will distribute the remaining $8o as dividends.
If the taxpayer invests in Company A he will receive $ioo which would be in-
cluded in his receipts and subjected to a 5o% tax unless saved or reinvested,
The $5o after-tax return on the $5oo of reduced consumption would equal the
before-tax return of io%. If he invests in Company B, he will receive an
$8o dividend that, if a $20 foreign tax credit were allowed, would produce a $6o
after-tax return-or 12% on reduced consumption under circumstances in which
the company earned io% before tax. In fact, the higher the foreign tax rate,
the higher the post-tax rate of return. See American Chicle Co. v. United States,
316 U.S. 450 (1942).
202 If the foreign tax were a tax on consumption, there would be no need for
a tax credit or imputation to preserve equal treatment of foreign and domestic in-
vestment.
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respect to the foreign investment because any lesser return from
the investment abroad is due to the foreign country's decision
to impose an income tax rather than an expenditure tax. This
argument suggests denying credits for foreign income tax al-
together. Denying foreign tax credits would simply require in-
clusion of cash receipts from foreign investments in the United
States expenditure tax base, but would result in an advantage
for domestic investments, whose returns would not be reduced
by income taxes.
Limiting either imputation and crediting of foreign taxes or
denial of foreign tax credits to instances in which investments
have been subject to United States expenditure tax treatment
would require distinguishing pre-enactment from post-enactment
investments, an extremely difficult rule to administer. This might
be necessary, however, if continuing present treatment of foreign
investments made under the current income tax rules were con-
sidered necessary by the Congress. If such a "grandfather" pro-
vision proves necessary, it would be simpler to continue to allow
the foreign tax credit with respect to all foreign-source income,
but to deny immediate deduction for investments abroad. While
such a distinction might create controversy under the General
Agreement on Taxes and Tariffs, there are precedents; the in-
vestment credit, for example, does not apply to foreign invest-
ments by United States corporations or individuals." 3 Such a
rule, however, would require retention of income tax treatment
for foreign-source income. It would then be necessary, for ex-
ample, to distinguish depreciable from nondepreciable assets
and to provide depreciation allowances with respect to the former
as under the current income tax. The prospect of an expenditure
tax system for domestic investments coupled with an income tax
system for foreign investments is not appealing.
A far simpler solution would be to treat all foreign-source
investment and income on a cash-flow basis, and either impute
and credit foreign income taxes to shareholders or disallow foreign
tax credits altogether. The impact of such rules on the interna-
tional flows of capital and labor merits further study. The issue
of deferral of taxation of income earned abroad, which has en-
gendered great controversy under the income tax, should dis-
appear under an expenditure tax.204 Foreign-source receipts
would be includible in expenditure tax accounts on the same
cash-flow basis as other investments.
20 3 See I.R.C. § 48(a)(7).
204 There are special provisions of the code to eliminate or limit deferral by
taxing U.S. shareholders of controlled foreign corporations on certain types of
distributed earnings of such corporations. See I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (Subpart F);
id. § 553 (foreign personal holding companies).
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C. Emigration and Immigration
The Meade Commission and Professor Lodin argue that there
will be a substantial incentive for persons to leave an expenditure
tax country when they intend to dissave by living on previously
accumulated capital. To deal with this problem the Meade Com-
mission proposes a special tax on emigrants that is intended to
recapture relief initially granted when taxpayers were allowed
deductions for savings. 0 5 It would require taxpayers to know the
total value on the date of emigration of all assets previously
deducted in calculating expenditure taxes; the value, adjusted
for inflation, of assets as of the date the expenditure tax was
introduced; and the value, adjusted for inflation, of gifts and
bequests subjected to transfer tax. Additional adjustments would
be required if the taxpayer were previously an immigrant. As an
alternative, the Meade Commission suggests a special tax on the
entire value of an emigrant's assets. Professor Lodin's proposals
are substantially similar.206
Lengthy discussion of these proposals does not seem neces-
sary; they are unworkable and probably impossible to enforce
in the United States -certainly impossible without restrictions
on the movement of capital to foreign countries. Although the
predictions by the Meade Commission and Professor Lodin of
widespread avoidance of British and Swedish expenditure taxes
through emigration are troubling, the problem may be more
significant for European countries than for the United States.
It is simply impossible to know in advance whether the shift
from an income tax to an expenditure tax will induce United
States citizens to emigrate in any significant numbers. 07 In one
sense at least, the tax avoidance problem seems likely to be less
significant under an expenditure tax than under an income tax.
Under an income tax, persons need only move capital to another
country to avoid tax; under an expenditure tax, an individual
would have to move himself. Moreover, if nonresident United
States citizens were subject to expenditure tax on worldwide
consumption, they could avoid tax only by abandoning citizenship.
Elaborate mechanisms to deal with emigrants should be avoided
unless and until expenditure tax experience demonstrates that
they are essential.
New problems of enforcement and collection, however, do
205 See MEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 438-42.
20
1 See S. LODIX', supra note 3, at zo8-io. Professor Lodin's proposals would
be easier to adopt in Sweden because that country already has a net wealth tax.
207In any event, any such tendency of United States citizens and residents to
emigrate should be offset by the countervailing tendency of persons to immigrate
to the United States to avoid income taxes abroad.
1648 [VOL. 92:1575
seem likely to arise under an expenditure tax when individuals
obtain a deduction upon purchase of an asset and attempt to
exclude the asset's sale price from receipts, perhaps by selling
it abroad. Under an income tax, all that is at stake when assets
are sold is the tax on -the gain from the asset; under an expend-
iture tax, the asset's entire sale price would be included in the
base, and, if not included, tax-free consumption in an amount
equal to the entire sale price could be achieved. Thus, greater
policing of foreign sales, including those of foreign trusts, may
prove necessary.
Because expenditure tax deductions would be allowed for the
purchase of investment assets, it would seem necessary to include
in receipts for the year of immigration the amount of cash (or
consumption goods) imported by immigrants or otherwise to
limit the amount an immigrant can deduct against subsequent
receipts. If such rules were not adopted, immigrants would con-
sume imported cash free of expenditure tax. The treatment of
cash brought to this country by immigrants is related to the gen-
eral treatment of cash balances upon enactment of an expendi-
ture tax, a problem which is discussed in Part IX.
IX. TRANSITIONAL PROBLEMS
The change from income to expenditure taxation would con-
stitute a major revision of the tax system and would require care-
ful consideration of transitional problems. The expenditure tax
base of those low income taxpayers who spend more than their
income would be greater than an income base, but rates and
exemptions could be adjusted to eliminate any increase in tax.
For many low and moderate income taxpayers whose income
and consumption are approximately equal, the change would not
significantly affect tax liability and should cause no special prob-
lems. By contrast, the situation of taxpayers who have accum-
ulated wealth under an income tax that would be spent under an
expenditure tax has brought forth special transitional proposals 08
For example, a retiree who had saved his earnings under the
income tax to consume during retirement would be liable for
expenditure tax on this amount. Such taxation of income which
has been taxed in the past has been denominated a "carryover
problem." 200 A second problem - a "price change" 210 - would
arise for persons whose investments received preferential treat-
208FEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 187-92, 198-200; S. LODIN, supra note
.3, at 123-27; see BLUEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 181-215.
200 BLUEPRINTS, supra note 3, at x82.
210d. at 183.
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ment under the income tax but would not under an expenditure
tax. The price of such assets would decline as investors sold them
to buyers no longer attracted by a tax-favored yield. Here the
alleged inequity would not be due to prior income tax burdens,
but rather to the frustration of expectations that the investments
would continue to receive favored treatment.
There are two basic attitudes which might inform recom-
mendations for transition. The politically dominant approach
to significant changes in the tax law has been to protect the ex-
pectations of taxpayers who have "relied" on existing law; pro-
tection typically takes the form of "grandfathered" effective
dates."' The Treasury argues in Blueprints for grandfathering
whether "price changes" or "carryover problems" are involved.
An alternative perspective about tax law transitions, which I have
advanced in greater detail elsewhere, 1 ' is that neither fairness
nor efficiency demands grandfathered effective dates, but that
when the magnitude of change is large, its impact should be re-
duced through delayed or phased-in effective dates rather than
grandfathering.
It may be possible to distinguish some effects described by
the Treasury as "carryover problems" from "price changes," be-
cause the wealth effects of the former would not necessarily be
reflected in the market price of individual assets, but the two
kinds of problems are generally similar in effect. In the case of
a retiree who had accumulated wealth to consume during retire-
ment, funds available for consumption would necessarily be less
than was anticipated. Likewise, when an asset declines in value
because its yield is no longer treated advantageously under the
new law, the owner's ability to consume is also decreased. As-
suming the decrease in consumption in each case were similar
in magnitude, I would treat the problems analytically as one -
as a wealth reduction due to a change in law.
Assuming that the relevant criterion is the magnitude of the
loss of wealth due to frustration of expectations, the question
remains under what circumstances expectations should be pro-
tected. The argument that reliance on existing law should be
protected as a matter of fairness is problematic and suffers from
circularity. This argument, in effect, would treat the recipient
of a tax benefit as if he had entered into a contract with the
government which precluded the government from changing the
law. Tastes and social conditions change, however, and such
211 See sources cited note 208 supra.
=2 See Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (X977); ABA Simplification Report, supra note 31,
at 676-86.
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changes are often reflected through the political process as changes
in law. To be reasonable, expectations in the tax law context
should be tempered by the subjective probability that the law
will be altered. Individual reliance on the status quo simply
does not suffice as a basis for compensation or grandfathered
effective dates.
Fairness arguments grounded upon individuals' reliance have
tended to concentrate on protecting only those individuals who
are nominally affected by a change in the law. For example, in
the case of an exemption for state and local bond interest, ad-
vocates of compensation to losers would compensate only the
holders of tax-exempt bonds. It has not been suggested, how-
ever, that issuers of tax-exempt bonds, who may well have struc-
tured their financing plans on the expectation that exempt status
would continue into the future, are entitled to continuation of the
tax exemption because of their "reliance" interest. Nor has it
been argued that those who demanded or supplied substitutes, on
the assumption that the exemption would continue, should also
be protected. If the fairness of change depends upon individual
reliance, all persons who might be expected to have altered be-
havior because of a particular tax rule must be protected.
If fairness demands protection of all whose expectations are
upset by a change in law, grandfathered effective date rules will
typically be inadequate to the task. Nothing short of perfect
stability of legal rules seems likely to suffice. Uncertainty neces-
sarily will produce winners and losers. But a requirement that
once a law is enacted it must remain unchanged raises fairness
problems itself, particularly in the context of law produced by
representative democratic political institutions subject to periodic
changes in representation and political leadership. 13
A. The Problem of Income Tax-Favored Investments
Upon the introduction of an expenditure tax, holders of assets
whose proceeds now receive favored treatment would tend to
suffer a decline in value as favorable tax treatment is extended
to investments generally. 14 This effect will be explored with
reference to state and local bonds, on the assumption that interest
on such bonds would be included in receipts under an expenditure
tax and therefore treated similarly to return on other investment
assets.
21
3 See Graetz, supra note 212, at 65.
214 Analogous issues regarding changes in the law arise in an income tax con-
text. See, e.g., id.; BLUEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 181-215; Committee on Tax
Policy, New York State Bar Association, Retroactivity of Tax Legislation, 29 TAX
LAW. 21 (1975); Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule of
Prospectivity, 84 HARV. L. REv. 436 (1970).
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If owners of state and local bonds were not protected through
a grandfathered effective date rule, the value of their bonds
would decline relative to other investment assets and there would
be no difference in the value of state and local bonds and, for
example, corporate bonds of similar risk. Protecting holders of
tax-favored assets by a grandfathered effective date, however,
may result in an increase in the value of the asset. For example,
under the income tax, if the exclusion of interest on municipal
bonds were repealed only for bonds issued after the date of
enactment, interest on previously issued bonds would remain
exempt from tax. Since the bonds are not perpetual obligations,
once all of the bonds outstanding as of the enactment date reach
maturity, all interest would be subject to tax. The maximum
supply of tax-exempt bonds would be fixed as of the date of
enactment, and with varying maturity dates for the bonds out-
standing at that time, the supply of tax-exempt bonds would
subsequently shrink until all of the bonds had matured. With a
grandfathered effective date, the value of outstanding municipal
bonds would rise as higher bracket taxpayers purchased these
bonds from lower bracket taxpayers. 15
In order to protect the position of those who enjoy favored
treatment under the income tax, special rules would be needed
to distinguish the expenditure tax treatment of municipal bonds
from that of other assets. If other pre-enactment assets were
generally included in initial expenditure tax receipts, exemption
of yield or deduction for basis (or value) of income tax-favored
assets would protect the owners of such assets. If, on the other
hand, pre-enactment assets were generally provided a special
transitional expenditure tax deduction or exclusion, an additional
benefit would have to be provided to maintain the relative ad-
vantage of the tax-favored investment. For example, if pre-
enactment corporate bonds were treated as expenditure tax pre-
paid (either through the Yield-Exemption option which would
exclude the interest and sale price of such bonds from tax re-
ceipts, or through an immediate deduction for the assets' basis or
value), it would be necessary to provide both an expenditure tax
215 See Graetz, supra note 212, at 60-63. Subsidizing production of specified
goods, through favored tax treatment or otherwise, will typically result in a decrease
in the price of the subsidized goods and an increase in their output. The precise
effects of the subsidy on price and quantity would depend upon the elasticities of
supply and demand of the good. If the subsidy were repealed, ceteris paribus,
the output and price would be expected to return to the equilibrium in effect before
the subsidy was introduced. But if certain firms were grandfathered so that their
subsidies would be continued, those firms would enjoy economic rents (in this case,
increased relative value).
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exclusion and a deduction for state and local bonds issued before
the date of enactment.
The problem of special transitional treatment of income tax-
favored assets is further complicated by arguments that certain
assets which have received preferential income tax treatment
should be treated less favorably under an expenditure tax. The
Meade Commission, for example, argues that pension benefits
which have received expenditure tax treatment under the income
tax (i.e., were not taxed when earned) should not be eligible for
the transitional exclusion treatment proposed for assets which
have previously been accumulated out of after-tax income. In
fact, the Meade Commission would reduce the amount of assets
otherwise eligible for transitional relief by the amount of ac-
cumulated pension benefits.21 State and local bonds might also
be characterized as having approximately received expenditure
tax treatment under the income tax (although they are advantaged
through Yield-Exemption rather than Immediate-Deduction).
This fact, however, would be of little comfort to persons concerned
with the adverse wealth effects (due to the decline in value of
such bonds) which would occur if no special treatment were
provided.
In general, grandfathered effective dates should not be en-
acted to protect assets that have received favored treatment
under the income tax. Grandfather rules should typically be re-
jected in favor of delayed or phased-in effective dates. 17 The
owners of assets that received preferential treatment under the
income tax law would suffer a decrease in wealth which would,
in effect, be attributable to the termination of the income tax on
other investments. Under such circumstances, the arguments for
protecting those who 'hold tax-favored investments seem even
less compelling than in the context of income tax repeal of tax-
favored treatment, even though their disappointment (and the
decline in the value of their assets) would be identical.
B. The Problem of Wealth Accumulated
After Payment of Income Taxes
Commentators who have considered transition to an expendi-
ture tax have been principally concerned with persons who have
accumulated wealth out of taxed income and would spend it after
enactment of an expenditure tax. Taxation of such expenditures
is considered inequitable if such an individual is compared with
one whose income, savings, and consumption all occur after or
before enactment of an expenditure tax. The combined income
2 l See MEADE REPORT, supra note 3, at 19o.
217 See Graetz, supra note 212.
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and expenditure taxes on an individual caught in the transition
might be greater than the total taxes which would be imposed if
all his income, savings, and consumption had taken place under
either an income tax or an expenditure tax.
To prevent this putative inequity, Blueprints 218 and Profes-
sor Lodin 21 recommend that at the inception of an expenditure
tax all existing assets should be treated as tax prepaid; in other
words, pre-enactment assets would not be taxed on a cash-flow
basis but rather would be excluded from expenditure tax com-
putations. To minimize "inequitable distribution effects" of such
treatment, the Treasury recommends that taxpayers be required
for a ten-year period to compute both income and expenditure
tax liability and pay the greater amount.220 All unrealized capital
gains would be subjected to income taxation at the end of the
ten-year transition period. The Meade Commission also raised
the possibility of phasing-in the expenditure tax by substituting
an additional one-tenth of the expenditure tax base for an equal
share of the income tax base each year for ten years.221 Because
of reservations about this approach, however, the Commission
alternatively recommended that individuals who hold assets on the
date of enactment be given tax relief. Such relief would be limited
to an amount which would vary directly with the taxpayer's
age.22s This limitation is presumably intended to ensure that
wealthy individuals would not avoid all payment of expenditure
taxes into the indefinite future simply because they have paid
income taxes in the past. If, for example, relief were not subject
to such a dollar limitation, a person with $i,ooo,ooo of assets
treated as expenditure tax prepaid on the date of enactment
could consume $ioo,ooo a year tax-free for ten years, even if she
earned no additional income. If additional income were earned
and saved, the imposition of expenditure tax might be delayed
indefinitely.
Assuming that the alleged inequity due to a shift from income
to expenditure taxation for persons with pre-enactment wealth
should be addressed, the principal objection to the Treasury and
Meade Commission recommendations is that they are unduly
complex. Each involves a ten-year phase-in during which in-
dividuals are required either to compute both income and ex-
penditure tax or to make fractional "expenditure tax adjust-
ments" to income tax calculations; the Meade Commission re-
218 See BLUEPRiNTs, supra note 3, at 209.
219 See S. LoDIN, supra note 3, at 123.
2 20 See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 205, 209-I. The Treasury suggests
that this requirement might be limited to wealthier taxpayers. See id. at 224 n.12.
221 See MEADF REFoRT, supra note 3, at i88.
222 See id. at 189-91.
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quires full valuation of assets at the date of enactment,22 3 and
both the Meade Commission and the Treasury require realization
of all unrealized gains prior to making the expenditure tax fully
effective.22 4 In addition, the Treasury's transitional proposals are
complicated by the decision to permit the expenditure tax Yield-
Exemption option for financial assets, discussed in Part IV.
If relief is to be granted with respect to assets acquired before
enactment, it should take the form of an immediate deduction of
the basis of assets held on the date of enactment (perhaps limited
to a maximum dollar amount with a carryover or required spread
over a period of years). This would eliminate the need for a
realization date for unrealized capital gains and also would
eliminate any need for taxpayers to sell pre-enactment assets to
obtain expenditure tax deductions. In addition, it would avoid
any subsequent increase in tax-free consumption from post-enact-
ment appreciation which would be possible under the Treasury's
proposal to exempt pre-enactment assets from expenditure tax
computations.
Because of the variety of fully and partly exempt sources of
income under current law, limiting relief to assets that have been
purchased with taxed income would add complexity to the transi-
tion. For example, pension benefits have not been taxed, and
realized capital gains have been only partly taxed. Inherited
wealth has been taxed only to the extent that unrealized gains
have not escaped income taxation through stepped-up basis
provisions. Investments in state and local bonds, real estate, oil
and gas, motion pictures, farming, etc., might have been untaxed,
partly taxed, or subsidized. Although one might argue for special
rules either to deny transitional relief or to preserve tax-favored
treatment in such cases, unacceptable complexity would neces-
sarily result from either choice. On balance, I would deny
special transitional relief to all assets without attempting to de-
termine whether they were accumulated from taxed or untaxed
income. Providing transitional relief limited to cases in which
income was previously taxed (since the equity case seems some-
what stronger here) would necessarily require higher tax rates
on consumption (and therefore a greater tax burden on wages)
and would cause undue complexity in compliance and administra-
tion.225
121 See id.
124 See id.; BLUEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 205, 209"-I1.
221 To avoid the most difficult problems of transition described in the previous
Sections of this Part, Professor Andrews, following Kaldor, has recommended that
the transition to an expenditure tax should be approached by first phasing in a
"supplemental personal expenditure tax." Andrews, A Supplemental Expenditure
Tax, in BROOKInGS REPORT, supra note 4; N. KALDOR, supra note i, at 224.
1979] 1655
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
In the short run at least, the change from an income tax to
an expenditure tax should increase the after-tax return from
savings and investments and would thus benefit those who are
able to save, whether from wages or accumulated wealth. The
principal difficulties of transition would occur for persons who
This tax would basically be a graduated cash-flow expenditure tax designed to
replace that portion of the income tax with marginal rates in excess of 40%.
An exemption of $2o,o0o-$3o,00o would be allowed to exempt from the tax
all taxpayers below the 407 marginal income bracket. Professor Andrews
argues that such a tax would maintain the progressivity of current income tax law
and would, at the same time, eliminate "the worst distortions and inequities in the
existing [income] tax [which] result from the application of very high marginal
rates to a base in which there are [wide] disparities in the treatment of investment
returns." Andrews, supra. Existing disparities in the treatment of such returns
would be maintained in the basic income tax but the supplemental expenditure
tax would be imposed on a comprehensive tax base which would not provide tax
incentives for particular kinds of investments. Whether this is politically possible,
even in the context of a supplemental expenditure tax, is doubtful. Professor
Andrews apparently believes that retention of a basic income tax with rates up to
40% would enable a supplemental expenditure tax to be enacted without
any of the restructuring of the corporate income tax or international taxation which
this Article considers essential to enactment of a general expenditure tax. Such
issues deserve careful attention. Problems of coordinating the supplemental ex-
penditure tax with the income tax also appear inevitable. Difficulties might
occur, for example, if gifts were taxed to donors under the income tax and to
donees under the expenditure tax.
Professor Andrews' proposal is related to a suggestion advanced by the Meade
Commission. MEAn. REPORT, supra note 3, at 204-15, 442-46. The Meade Com-
mission also considered a graduated expenditure tax limited in application to
higher bracket taxpayers, to ease the transitional problems of moving to a
generally applicable expenditure tax. Id. at 213. It would, however, have
combined a graduated expenditure tax with a single basic rate of tax on con-
sumption (probably in the form of a value-added tax) rather than with an in-
come tax.
Each of these approaches to transition merits detailed consideration. I have
argued elsewhere that a graduated expenditure tax may be desirable as a replace-
ment for the minimum tax provisions of current law. Graetz, supra note I07. How-
ever, for this purpose an expenditure tax should be an alternative to the income
tax-payable by taxpayers with substantial incomes (say over $5o,ooo) when-
ever it exceeds the individuals' regular income tax liabilities-not an additional
tax as recommended by Professor Andrews.
The most troubling aspect of the Andrews proposal is its treatment of savings.
Professor Andrews argues that adopting a supplemental personal expenditure tax
in place of income tax rates over 40% would provide "relief for savers" on a
much more "coherent and uniform basis" than the many special provisions of the
current income tax, concluding that "[t]he structure of the change assures that it
would give the most relief to those whose savings are now most severely taxed."
Andrews, supra. While this is certainly true, the fact that the proposal provides
a tax advantage only for the savings of persons with taxable incomes of about
$3o,ooo or more raises serious questions about its fairness. The Meade Commis-
sion would avoid this difficulty by advantaging the savings of all taxpayers, and
its combination of a value-added tax and a supplemental graduated expenditure
tax seems preferable to Andrews' income-expenditure tax combination.
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consume a large portion of their wealth in the early years fol-
lowing enactment and would thus be unable to enjoy the increased
after-tax returns from savings which would likely accrue in the
short run under an expenditure tax.226 This circumstance is likely
to occur most frequently for retired elderly taxpayers.
The income tax contains three principal benefits available to
taxpayers aged sixty-five or over. The first of these benefits is
the exclusion from income of social security benefits (which have
been recommended for taxation under an expenditure tax).22
The second is an extra personal exemption of $iooo available to
every person aged sixty-five or over.228 The third is the retire-
ment income credit, which is designed to reduce tax on elderly
persons' income (including a certain amount of earnings) so long
as total income is limited,229 principally benefiting low and mod-
erate income taxpayers. These income tax provisions have been
adopted over the past forty years without any comprehensive
rationale. Although some form of reduced income taxation for
the elderly can be supported on the grounds that the income tax
penalizes deferred consumption relative to present consumption,
the precise benefits of current law are quite difficult to justify
theoretically. Under an expenditure tax, the main argument for
special benefits for the elderly generally disappears. Taxpayers
who defer consumption until retirement would not face any
relative tax disadvantage.
The current generation of elderly persons, however, has been
subject to income tax during its working years and would be
subject to expenditure tax after retirement without the offsetting
benefit of being able to save for a substantial period of time under
advantageous expenditure tax conditions. It would therefore seem
appropriate to continue some special benefit for the elderly during
the early years of expenditure taxation. This could take the form
of a special dollar exclusion which could be a large amount when
the tax is first introduced and gradually phased down.230 It
should be recognized, however, that there will be tremendous
political pressure to maintain a special benefit for the elderly
at a high level. Thus, while such a special exclusion is consider-
ably simpler (and, as this Section has argued, preferable on other
28 The question whether any increase in after-tax return would occur under
an expenditure tax in the long run, or whether increases in the supply of capital
would result in a reduction of pre-tax and therefore after-tax returns, is beyond
the scope of this Article.
217 See p. 1594 supra.
.2.See I.R.C. § i~i(c).
2 29 See id. § 37.
23To avoid an abrupt difference in tax burdens due to age at enactment, the
special benefit would also probably have to be phased in for taxpayers between
ages 60 and 65.
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grounds) than other forms of transitional relief, its attendant
political risks are serious.
For taxpayers other than the elderly, a delayed effective date
would provide an opportunity to make adjustments to the new
system and would reduce the impact of the change. A phase-in
of the expenditure tax seems less feasible than a delayed effective
date because it would be necessary to retain all or part of the
income tax during the phase-in period to maintain aggregate rev-
enues. A phase-in would therefore require computation of both
income and expenditure tax liabilities during the transition. A de-
layed effective date would enable individuals who had received
more favorable treatment under an income tax to realize gains or
losses while the income tax was still in effect. Transactions sub-
sequent to the effective date would result in taxation if proceeds
were consumed, but if proceeds were reinvested, no expenditure
tax would be due. It would seem appropriate, however, to pro-
vide greater ability during the transition period than under cur-
rent law to obtain income tax deductions for capital losses. If
further relief is considered essential, a deduction for a limited
amount of pre-enactment assets' bases could be provided, but
no such rule is recommended.
C. The Problem of Initial Cash Hoarding
Because financial assets would be taxed on a cash-flow basis
and gain on consumer durables would be included in receipts,231
the widespread pre-enactment shifting to "tax-prepaid" assets
feared by the Meade Commission and the Treasury would have to
take the form of pre-enactment hoarding of cash or pre-enactment
purchases of consumption for post-enactment use. If, for ex-
ample, taxpayers were to stuff their mattresses with currency
before the tax were implemented, these amounts could then be
consumed without being taken into receipts and therefore with-
out incurring any expenditure tax liability. Cash hoarding would
be a problem only preceding enactment of the expenditure tax.
Subsequent to enactment it would be to taxpayers' advantage to
put cash into savings or investments which would produce an
immediate deduction. If, as has been recommended in this Part,
no transitional relief were to be provided for assets generally,
initial cash balances should be included in receipts. To detect
such cash, it would probably be necessary as a practical matter
to rely on information reports of large withdrawals from savings
accounts and of substantial sales of investment assets. Such
detection would nevertheless be quite difficult.
As an aid to enforcement, it would probably be desirable to
231 See pp. i598-620 supra.
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require individuals to file an initial report listing all assets on hand
at the inception of an expenditure tax. If willful misstatements
were subject to punishment as fraud, truthful information would
likely be forthcoming. In addition, if an expenditure tax were
implemented with a delayed effective date and a statement of
assets were required immediately following enactment, convert-
ing assets to cash prior to the effective date would result in
a loss of earnings. This might have some further impact in
deterring cash hoarding. A report of initial wealth could also
be required if, as a transitional matter, tax-free expenditures
out of savings accumulated before enactment of the expenditure
tax were permitted. Conversion of assets to cash would not be
a problem with such a transition, but such statements would
burden both the Internal Revenue Service and taxpayers and
should not be required unless potential cash hoarding is expected
to be substantial.
X. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis suggests that the obstacles to imple-
menting a progressive personal tax on consumption would be sub-
stantial, but not absolutely prohibitive. An administratively
feasible expenditure tax is possible in the United States today,
but it is impossible to know whether a consumption tax which
would emerge from the political process would in fact achieve the
efficiency and fairness advantages that its proponents claim are
theoretically possible. Moreover, the problems of implementation
which have been identified in this Article suggest the need for
great caution in going forward with expenditure tax proposals.
The following problems will likely prove particularly burden-
some:
First, an expenditure tax seems to require a tax-exclusive
base and thus extremely high nominal marginal rates -well in
excess of ioo% -if an approximation of the distributional bur-
den of the current income tax is to be maintained. The impact of
such a rate structure both in terms of acceptance of the tax
by the populace and its impact in producing distorted behavior
require careful attention.
Second, expenditure taxation at the personal level implies
no separate tax on income of corporations. Repeal of the corpo-
rate income tax would result in the loss of a significant source
of revenue and would be quite unpopular politically. On the
other hand, retention of the corporate income tax in its current
form would eliminate many of the advantages asserted on behalf
of an expenditure tax. In particular, the problems of deprecia-
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tion, taxing inflationary gains, and distinguishing realized from
unrealized gains are extremely important at the corporate level.
A compromise that would restructure the corporate tax to con-
form more closely to the existence of an expenditure tax at the
personal level seems likely to reduce revenues substantially, and
at the same time to produce a subsidy, rather than a tax, for new
corporate investments.
Third, coordination of expenditure taxation in the United
States with income taxation and value-added taxation by the other
industrial nations will be quite difficult as a practical matter, and
may well have significant effects on international flows of capital
and labor.
Fourth, the transitional problems of moving from income
to expenditure taxation are likely to prove enormously trouble-
some. While this Article has argued for a relatively simple transi-
tion with transitional relief generally limited to elderly taxpayers,
these proposals are contrary to the prevailing view which requires
grandfathering of prior transactions and are thus unlikely to
prove politically acceptable. Other transitions -the Treasury's
proposal for a ten-year period of joint income and expenditure
taxation, for example-would be very burdensome to both tax-
payers and the Internal Revenue Service.
Fifth, if gifts are taxed to donees (which this Article has
suggested as the appropriate expenditure tax rule), new taxes on
wealth or significantly increased transfer (estate and gift) taxes
appear essential to maintain the distributional pattern of existing
taxes. New wealth taxes will create important questions of de-
sign and implementation themselves, and increased transfer taxes
run directly counter to recent legislation reducing the estate tax
base by about one-third. In addition, to the extent that a move
from income to expenditure taxation requires new or increased
taxes on savings, many of the efficiency advantages claimed for
the expenditure tax will be reduced.
Sixth, if the congressional practice of subsidizing particular
investments or other transactions through income tax deductions
and exclusions were to be incorporated into a personal expenditure
tax, many of the simplification advantages claimed for the tax
would disappear. Records of basis, for example, would be re-
quired if the present favored treatment of charitable contribu-
tions of property were to be retained and negative taxes would be
necessary to advantage special kinds of investments, such as state
and local municipal bonds.
Seventh, if a broadly available Yield-Exemption option such
as that proposed by the Treasury in Blueprints were essential
to adoption of the tax, tax gamesmanship would be well-rewarded,
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tax shelters would likely abound, and considerable complexity
in tax practice relating to investment advice would remain.
Eighth, expenditure taxation increases the need to include
in the personal tax base fringe benefits and expenditures which
now qualify as business deductions.
In sum, the practical problems of implementing a graduated
tax on consumption are indeed great - far greater than has
been previously suggested by its recent proponents. Given these
practical difficulties, proponents of such a tax should be required
to demonstrate that its claimed advantages in terms of equity
and economic efficiency are real and cannot be achieved in a sim-
pler fashion - either through changes in the income tax, such
as new deductions for some amount of individual savings and
increased opportunities to rollover and defer taxation of invest-
ment gains or, more dramatically, through a value-added or
national sales tax for the majority of taxpayers with an income
tax for upper income individuals. Unless and until this burden is
met, replacing the income tax with a progressive personal tax on
consumption should remain low on the lst of political priorities,
and the principal utility of expenditure tax analysis should con-
tinue to lie in illuminating issues of income taxation and increas-
ing our understanding of tax policy.
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